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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study analyzes the US sanction regime imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
This single case study assesses its weaknesses and shortcomings in order to present a preliminary 
conclusion of the character of Iranian policies to bust the US sanctions regime.  In charting the 
evolution of the US sanction regime through three distinct “waves” of sanctions the study 
highlighted the general shortcomings of the regime.  First, the US sanction regime has failed to 
impose significant costs on Iran.  Second, the slow pace of unveiling each new wave of sanctions  
failed to bring the necessary immediate pressure on Iran.  Third, the inability of the US to gain 
sufficient multilateral support has limited the scope of the sanctions.  These failures has allowed 
the Iranian leadership to construct a viable counterstrategy to bust US sanctions and continue the 
stalemate over the conflict of an Iranian foreign policy based on supporting Hamas and 
Hezbollah and the continued secrecy of its nuclear program.  The Iranian counterstrategy has 
been centered on a domestic economic policy of autonomy, the courting of states outside the US 
sanction regime through the use of its valuable energy resources and the procurement of 
sanctioned goods through regional third party states.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 The sanctions regime against Iran is one of the most sustained campaigns of economic 
coercion in US foreign policy.  The use of economic sanctions as the primary tool of a foreign 
policy is unique in the wider story of how the US has used economic sanctions in the post WWII 
global order.  Investigating the application of a sustained comprehensive sanction regime the 
Iranian case presents a challenge to the predominant thinking about economic sanctions.  Indeed, 
it is the uniqueness of US policy in this regard that has led to a lack of scholarly understanding as 
to how a state responds to a targeted campaign of comprehensive economic sanctions.  This 
thesis is intended to provide the foundation for the development of a theory for the strategic 
context of a state under a comprehensive sanction regime.   
 Economic sanctions are a type of economic coercion and are a useful option for the 
policymaker.  The use and abuse of economic sanctions provided a lively debate in the scholarly 
community with regard to their utility in achieving the goals of the policymaker.  Sanctions have 
their appeal in being a rather serious threat which, in the case where threats fail to yield the 
desired changes in the target state‟s behavior, following through with imposing sanctions is often 
a more appealing approach than threatening and engaging in military action.  Economic 
sanctions function as a policy whereby the degree and impact of the policy is under reasonable 
control to those who implement them, and whose consequences are not so dire that the targets of 
economic sanctions respond with drastic and violent reactions.  Diplomatically, states can enact 
sanctions as a response to moral issues where military action may not warrant.  Militarily, 
sanctions can restrict an opponent‟s access to weapons and technology.  It is the utility of 
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economic sanctions as somewhat of a “middle way” that have provided many instances of 
economic coercion in the post WWII global order. 
  Economic coercion is often used in conjunction with other policies.  As part of a larger 
strategy, sanctions serve as a means of accomplishing a policy goal.  During times of war, 
economically destructive policies are used to inhibit an enemy from effectively mustering 
resources on the battlefield.  Blockading enemy ports, denying access to resources outside the 
waring country, preventing the flow of international payments for supplies, attacking supply and 
commerce logistics and coercing allies and nonaligned states from trading with the enemy are all 
part of the larger grand strategy of war.  Sanctions and economic coercion in general, have 
similar uses in times of peace.  After victory in World War II the US shifted its global policy to a 
primarily economic orientation.  The establishment and maintenance of internal economic order 
required supporting policies from its allies.  Through intergovernmental agencies like the UN, 
World Bank and IMF the US was able to coordinate global economic policy.  In such a system, 
the use of military intervention to enforce economic policy was often unnecessary, 
counterproductive and simply undesirable.  Thus, the utility of sanctions in imposing costs to 
coerce a state through nonviolent, economic means (Kirshner, 1998).  It is in the context of the 
post-WWII era that sanctions are primarily understood today. 
 Opposed to the general use of force in the international system states have turned to less 
drastic measures of coercion.  The globalizing of the world economy and the rapid economic 
growth of the past 70 years have placed economic conditions and development at the forefront of 
what political leaders are expected to accomplish while in power.  This preliminary condition of 
sanctions logic reflects the usefulness of sanctions to the policymakers of the sending state.  If 
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sanctions can hurt the development of a state‟s economy, then the leaders will suffer domestic 
costs.  To alleviate these costs and maintain power a state‟s leaders will yield to the demands.  
Based on this rational model of behavior, sanctions appear to have much going for them, yet, 
most studies find severe problems in the various applications of economic sanctions.  Indeed, the 
attractiveness and apparent ease with which a state‟s leaders can threaten sanctions often leads to 
the wrongheaded application of this coercive tool.  What has resulted is the over–application of 
sanctions into situations where the policy has little chance of successfully coercing the target 
(Huffbauer et. al. 2008, ch. 1).  The relative ease in which sanctions can be threatened between 
two states in a dispute does not reflect the ability to marshal political support for the costs 
associated if the regime is imposed.  The result has been the checkered record of sanction 
success. 
 The mainstream of scholarship on economic sanctions has addressed this discrepancy 
between an effective policy tool and its often wrongheaded application.  Modern studies of 
economic sanctions are analyzed as being part of how states negotiate with each other.  The 
relationship can be defined as a country that threatens or imposes sanctions referred to as the 
“sender,” and the state which is the focus of those threats or policies referred to as the “target.”  
Here, a disagreement between the sender and target has been the catalyst of the situation, and 
sanctions are often tied to a specific action or policy of the target.  The purpose of an economic 
sanction is to impose a cost on a target and then remove the cost when the target complies.  The 
conflict that has ensued between the two states will need to be resolved if the target does not 
wish in incur the costs associated with the imposition of the threatened sanction.  This does not 
necessarily mean that sanctions are always intended to have devastating effects on the target.  
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Part of the utility of sanctions is that the degree and specificity of sanctions are controllable; 
thus, the sender can measure the stakes of the sanction more accurately.  In general, the scale of a 
sanction regime can be limited, specified and highly selective in the targeting of the target state‟s 
economy and leadership; or, comprehensive, targeting multiple sectors and intended to inflict 
significant costs to the state.  Regardless of scale, sanctions, as a tool of economic coercion, have 
been primarily investigated as a back and forth negotiation between states whereby scholars have 
debated as to the conditions required for the successful outcome of a sanctions policy.  
 In this view of economic sanctions, the threat and imposition of sanctions are 
conceptualized as states involved in a bargaining process (Cortright and Lopez 2002, Drezner 
2000).  Often the focus is on the economic and political “costs” to the sender and target whereby 
the leaders of these states are highly dependent on the requirement of perfect information. The 
emphasis is on the decision of the target to comply or yield to the political motivations of the 
sender state and accounting for the accurate costs associated to all options available to the target.  
This has fit in line with the game theory methodology used to determine the best conditions for 
sanctions successfully coercing an opponent; thus, when deciding whether or not sanctions 
“work” is when the target state complies with the sender‟s demands.   
 In the analysis of the rational negotiation approach the judgments and conclusions of a 
policy of economic sanctions is highly dependent on the outcome.  In using a cost/benefit 
approach that is tied to outcomes, the conclusion is that the best sanctions are the sanctions that 
are never implemented.  Because all sanctions carry costs to the sender (no powerful state is truly 
isolated from its target) the best outcome is where no costs are incurred and the target has 
complied to the sender‟s demands.  According to the rational negotiation approach economic 
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sanctions can work, often times work best, when the sender changes the behavior of the target 
without ever having to implement the sanction in the first place.  The scholarly work done in this 
approach has highlighted many apt and insightful observations in evaluating the process of 
initiating sanctions.  Indeed, the majority of observations fit within the scope of the rational 
negotiation approach.  That is, where the issue at stake is subject to minimal coercive efforts 
where the threat or imposition of low to moderate costs can successfully alter a target‟s behavior.  
As to this study, the expansive literature on evaluating the costs will be used in understanding the 
context of the strategic options faced by the target of sanctions.    
 Where the scope of this study differs is where the rational model of a singular instance of 
the use of sanctions as a negotiation gives way to a larger intransigence between the sender and 
target.  In a situation where the target refuses to yield to imposed sanctions and the sender 
pursues further sanctions the scope of the initial sanction regime widens with each successive 
round.  The result of this process is fundamentally different than the common case observed in 
the study of economic sanctions.  In a sustained campaign of sanctions the rational negotiation 
dynamic gives way to two fundamental aspects: first, what must the sender do to ensure further 
sanctions have the desired effect; and second, what is the target‟s response to mitigate the 
intended effects of the sanction.  
 This study will employ a case study research design to determine the strengths and 
weaknesses of the approach to sanction busting in the existing literature of economic sanctions.  
The premise that states naturally seek to undermine imposed sanctions by seeking alternate allies 
to engage in trade that replaces the loss associated is a given in the common understanding of 
economic coercion.  Much of the work done in sanctions is based on the assumption that if the 
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target state finds that it is incapable of replacing the costs of sanctions effectively and the target‟s 
leadership can give into the sender‟s demands without drastic domestic and international 
consequences than the sanction will likely succeed.  Sanctions are approached primarily from the 
perspective of the sender.  If the politics surrounding the issue is favorable and the sanction 
regime is effective then success is the sender‟s to lose.  What is often left out in most studies is a 
proper treatment of the target‟s counterstrategy in mitigating the sender‟s sanctions.  The 
sanctions literature can advise what type of sanction to use, whether the sanction regime should 
be multilateral, what type of target regime is most susceptible to sanctions and the scale of costs 
to inflict.  What the sanction literature has difficulty explaining is determining which 
counterstrategies work best for the target given the faults of the various conditions and policies 
of economic coercion.  The case of Iran in the sanctions literature presents a difficult challenge 
to the conception of what most sanctions studies intend to accomplish: providing advise to the 
sender.  The conception of this study is to provide an overview of the sanctions literature in the 
context of the Iranian case and then provide an explanation of the Iranian counterstrategy to 
undermine the sanction regime.   
 This study is intended to be only a preliminary approach to the subject of sanction 
busting, and will not develop a complete model of target state behavior.  The overall goal of the 
study is a theory generating case study, of which this thesis is the first part.  The nature of this 
study is primarily an exploratory one.  John Gerring (2007) defends this approach to case study 
research by stating that social science research requires some scholarly attention to be focused on 
these “exploratory” or “theory-building” exercises to break the conjecture/refutation cycle and 
define new problems for wider scholarly work.  Correspondingly, this initial study will be 
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limited in the external validity of its preliminary conclusions due to its small-N, single case 
structure.  The case of Iran has been chosen due to the extreme values of the traditional variables 
in the larger context of sanctions studies.   
 In terms of the duration of the sanction regime, the scale of costs sought by the US, the 
political motivations of both the US and Iran and the amount of economic and political capital 
expended to see both states‟ strategies through all of this distinguishes the Iranian case apart 
from most cases of economic coercion.  What is sought is an open ended study of the 
relationship between the traditional dependent variable, the likelihood of sanction success, and 
the independent variables, primarily defined in the sender‟s scope of action, in the context of the 
Iranian case to establish a new theory of target state behavior.  Gerring (2007, 104) does warn 
that this method does go against the maxim of “selecting based on the dependent variable,” in 
this case the failure of the US sanctions regime.  Yet, this is the purpose of extreme-case 
selection; to glean from the variance of values a common theme perhaps running through the 
wider body of observed cases which can redefine the theoretical relationship.  The issue of its 
wider application, that of the theory‟s external validity, can only be tested after it has been 
generated and not before. 
 To establish this study on solid theoretical grounding it will be necessary to examine the 
sanction regime through the literature on economic sanctions.  The analysis will look at the 
manner and degree in which the Iranian case differs from the conditions set forth by the previous 
works on economic coercion.  The primary theoretical purpose will focus on the “strategic 
context” that an imposed sanction regime creates between the target and the sender.  The main 
theoretical factors not developed in the scope of this study, but still requiring mentioning, are a 
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developing of a third party state‟s model, the institutional factors aiding in the target state‟s 
ability to bust sanctions and the policies available given the context of the sanction regime.  
While not covering all of the factors that contribute to the development of a complete model, the 
initial groundwork for the model will be constructed and this will provide a clear path for the 
work necessary to complete the larger scope of this study.  
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine the US sanction regime against Iran and discover 
what aspects of this policy have contributed to the counter strategy of Iran in overcoming the 
intended costs.  The second chapter will provide a general introduction to economic sanctions 
and an overview of the scholarly analysis of the conditions best associated with the successful 
application of sanctions policy.  After this, several studies will be reviewed that have examined 
how the targets of sanctions have adapted to the various restrictions placed on them through 
sanctions.  As discussed above there are many differences between the US sanction regime 
against Iran and the common use of sanctions in the wider scope of the policy.  The third chapter 
provides a basic overview of the US sanctions regime by providing the political context for each 
successive initiation of sanctions, the costs on Iran and the strengths and weaknesses of each 
policy.  The fourth chapter will provide a commentary using the established literature as a guide 
to critique US policy.  Combining the established analysis of the conditions best associated for 
successful sanctions and the analysis of scholars that have examined the means of how targets 
bust sanctions this chapter will end with providing the factors that best explain the ability of Iran 
to survive US sanctions.  The fifth and final chapter will summarize the findings of this thesis 
and use this to provide the basis of a general model of sanction busting and highlight areas 
needed for further research.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
  An economic sanction is any attempt by a state to disrupt the flow of economic 
interactions of another state.  The construction of supporting policies for enacting and enforcing 
economic sanctions will be referred to as a “sanctions regime.”  An economic sanction in the 
singular sense can refer to the type of economic activity associated with the focus on the policy, 
i.e. trade, financial or monetary; which will be covered more in depth below.  Also, an economic 
sanction can refer to the sector associated with the focus of the policy, i.e. energy, agricultural, 
military arms or financial.  The use of multiple sanctions across types of economic activity and 
sectors will be referred to as a “comprehensive sanctions regime” or as “comprehensive 
sanctions” depending on the rhetorical demands.  Attempts by a state to mitigate the costs, avoid 
enforcement and gain allies to subvert a comprehensive sanctions regime will be referred to as 
“sanction busting.”   
 For the purposes of this thesis the familiar terminology for sanctions will be used to 
define the state based actors involved.  All sanctions involve at least two states: one state that 
imposes the sanctions against another state whose behavior it wishes to alter by imposing the 
costs associated with the sanction.  In this basic relationship the state that imposes the sanction 
will be referred to as the “sender,” while the state that has the sanction imposed upon it will be 
referred to as the “target.”  This basic scenario of a sanction episode draws a linear connection 
between the two principal actors.  However, no sanction episode occurs within a vacuum, as the 
costs associated with the sanction are spread to the other states with relations either with the 
sender or the target.  Such states not involved in the basic dichotomy above will be referred to as 
 10 
 
“third party states” regardless of the affiliation to either the sender or target such states have 
chosen.  
 As stated, this paper will analyze the factors that contribute to the target of sanctions in 
busting behavior.  In doing so, states use the main entities and arraignments available in the 
modern globalized economy.  For state to state interactions, the sender and target will often 
attempt to acquire the assistance of other governments either sympathetic to the political factors 
or motivated by economic opportunities.  Regardless of affiliation states that officially engage in 
the policies of the sender or the target are referred to as “allies.”  Apart from the state based 
language above, states rely on various economic actors to carry out sanction busting.  Important 
in this analysis will be the role of autonomous nonstate actors such as multinational corporations 
(MNC) and state owned enterprises (SOE).  In defining the sanction busting interactions between 
all of these actors a relationship that involves an open, transparent and official connection 
between the target and another actor is referred to as a “formal” interaction, while the use of 
subterfuge, obfuscation, criminal and other methods outside the common international norms of 
transparency in economic interactions will be referred to as “informal.” 
Types of Sanctions 
 
 For the purposes of this study economic sanctions are divided into two camps: trade and 
financial sanctions.  Trade sanctions seek to impose costs by limiting the target‟s exports to 
outside markets and restricting imports into the target‟s domestic market (Hufbauer et. al., 2007).  
By denying a target the free flow of economic transactions the target sees costs increase by 
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lowering the prices received for exported goods and raising the price of imported substitute 
goods.  Apart from raising the costs of economic discourse the sender may seek to deny the 
target of a specific good all together.  In this case, the costs of losing access to markets does the 
economic damage intended and also serves to affect the strategic capability of a hostile target.  
Thus, the goods under sanction may have political significance beyond the economic costs.  This 
category, called strategic goods, are most often associated with the military basis of hard power; 
they can be direct capability goods from small arms to nuclear weapons technology and delivery 
systems or provide complementary functions such as computer technology, raw materials or 
sources of energy.  By far the most often used sanctions are also the easiest to ensure 
compliance; that of the sender limiting or denying its exports from reaching the target.  Import 
controls are used less due to complications in legal authority for the sender, except in extreme 
cases such as the US comprehensive sanctions taken against Cuba, Iran and Libya.   
 Financial sanctions seek to deny the target of the normal flow of money and investment.  
Senders can deny a target access to official monetary measures, such as access to central banks, 
or through the denial of promised aid.  Usually, this occurs in the denial of military and 
development assistance from the sender which then can be returned if the target complies.  Also, 
the sender can impose restrictions on private financial actors (banks, investment firms, MCO‟s) 
from investing in the target states‟ economy.  Such sanctions are intended to impose costs on 
benefits associated with the interruption of economic and political incentives already in place 
and then returning to status quo ante after the target capitulates.  A sender may also seek to 
confiscate the financial assets of state, private or individual actors located within the sovereignty 
of the sender.  Such “asset freezes” as they are known, work according to a hostage logic in the 
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costs they impose.  Financial sanctions share a commonality with trade sanctions in that they can 
be “targeted” to specific sectors or even specific actors within the target.  A sender may target 
the energy sector of a target while allowing investment in a target‟s agricultural sector to 
continue unhindered.  Similarly, the sender may sanction specific firms, be they SOE or private, 
due to its association with an offending political leader, as well as freeze all associated assets of 
that particular individual.   
 Within the context of a comprehensive sanctions regime, the use of sanctions would 
incorporate multiple sanctions across the types described above.  Apart from the basic typology 
of trade sanctions broadly defined as restrictions on physical goods to the that of financial 
sanctions defined as restrictions on capital, sanctions can be defined according to their scope.   
General sanctions, or embargoes, are bans on trade against an entire sector or even all sectors of 
the economy in the target state; because of the diffused nature of the targeting and the inability to 
control the effects throughout the economy of the target these sanctions have become known as 
“dumb” sanctions.  In contrast, targeted sanctions focus on specific institutions, institutions or 
individuals within the target state.  These sanctions, because of their ability to target specific 
strategic entities within a state and avoid the collateral damage of broader sanctions are known as 
“smart” sanctions.   
 Regardless of the tool, sanctions should be focused to serve the policy goal.  There is no 
one type of sanction or combination of sanctions that can guarantee to exert the pressure needed 
to ensure target state compliance.  The success of sanctions is dependent on several major factors 
discussed below.  The first discussed is the work of Hufbauer et. al.‟s study of sanction which set 
out to identify the conditions in which sanctions are most likely to succeed.  Next, is the debate 
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over the use of unilateral or multilateral sanction regimes in securing target state compliance.  
The third section will look at the domestic structure of the target in determining the appropriate 
sanctions to bring the most efficient pressure on the leadership of the target.  These sections will 
form the basis of how this thesis will evaluate the US sanctions regime against Iran.  The 
sections following these will deviate from the conception of asking what factors best lead to a 
sanctions regime success to focusing on which factors the target can use to undermine the initial 
conditions of a sanction regime.  This conceptual pivot is of primary importance due to the 
general nature of the sanctions literature as being primarily focused on the dilemmas facing the 
sender in constructing the sanction regime.  While this body of work has contributed much to the 
advances in economic coercion, the study is intended to be the first step in asking what are the 
primary dilemmas facing the target. 
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered 
 
 The classic analysis of economic sanctions entitled Economic Sanctions Reconsidered 
(ESR) by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliot and Barbara Oegg is the standard 
by which most studies draw their inspiration. The most recent edition expands the data used by 
the authors to include the post Cold War spike in sanction use.  Primarily, the study attempts to 
answer the question: do sanction work?  The criteria as to whether a policy of implementing 
sanctions works the authors chose to cite successes as cases where the target yielded to the policy 
goals of the sender.  For the authors, each sanctions episode has a beginning, middle and end; 
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with the end being either the capitulation or resistance of the target.  The goal of the authors is to 
find out what factors contribute to finding out when, not whether, economic sanctions work.   
 In examining the data collected on sanctions episodes, some 204 cases in the 3rd edition, 
Hufbauer et al. provide the scholar looking at sanctions a rich source of analytic material.  The 
variables are divided into political and economic sets.  Political variables include the context of 
the sanctions policy including the other policies in conjunction with the sanctions, the amount of 
international support, the role of international organizations and a typology of democratic and 
authoritarian states.  Economic variables include the measure of potential and realized costs to 
both the sender and target, the commercial ties between the sender and target, the size of the 
economy in aggregate and per capita terms, and the health of the target economy.  In the 
quantitative analysis the authors provide a thorough analysis of the potential conditions best 
suited for ensuring a successful sanctions policy.  Sanctions, according the authors, are a limited 
tool and are often misused in that policy makers often respond with the need to act in cases 
where punitive measures in foreign policy are warranted.   
 The analysis conducted with the above variables reflects the mixed record of economic 
sanction success.  The world of international politics is endlessly complicated and the 
policymaker is trying to solve problems with limited resources and time.  Indeed, Hufbauer et al. 
understand this and do not overreach in their conclusions as to why sanctions do not often 
achieve the stated goals of the policymaker.  In discounting the symbolic aspects of imposing 
sanctions the authors found that sanctions succeed in only 34% of the cases studied.  Within this, 
the authors divided the sender‟s demands by scale and found that modest goals were much more 
likely to have success, about 50% of the cases observed.  Target state policies that contained 
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heightened importance were not more likely to be abandoned in the face of sanctions (namely 
military operations).  For the authors, the ideal set of conditions for sanctions can be surmised as 
follows: the demands of the sender should be modest and not of great importance to the target; 
the target should be a democracy with significant economic ties to the sender so that imposed 
costs can be significant; autocratic regimes should be avoided; implementation of the sanctions 
should be done quickly and completely, with as few allies the better who are willing to absorb 
significant costs to their economy and have leaders in political positions to see the policy through 
(Hufbauer et. al., ch.6).  
 Such conditions lend the best chances of the sanctions succeeding in achieving the 
foreign policy goals of the sender, that is altering the policy of the target to conform the the 
senders demands (Huffbauer et. al., 157).  This rigid interpretation of sanction success does leave 
the other aspects of the sender‟s political motives for sanctions out of consideration.  The authors 
are also understanding of the use of sanctions in conjunction with other methods of foreign 
policy; namely military and diplomatic measures.  Thus, if the use of sanctions in a specific 
situation did not meet the criteria for sanction success, this does not mean the use of sanctions 
was ill-advised or wrong.  Sanctions are a limited tool, and their use and ability to inflict 
necessary costs are hampered by the political conditions to which they are tailored.  Sanctions 
can serve the domestic leaders of the sender by taking a moral stand against the reprehensible 
actions of dictators, achieving a more “rhetorical” or political victory than a policy success 
(Huffbauer et. al., 158-60).  Even when accounting for these gradations in sanctions success the 
partial success rate for sanction was still roughly 34% of the cases observed.   
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 ESR stands as a landmark in the study of sanctions.  The breadth of the study and the 
study‟s conceptualization of the essence of the analysis of sanction success provides the basis for 
the evaluation of a sanction regime.  This study relies on the on the work of Hufbauer et. al. for 
the definitional aspects of sanctions and providing a framework for the analysis.  The influence 
of ESR was in postulating the question of when economic sanctions work set the stage for the 
mainstream work of economic sanctions in attempting to find which of the factors identified 
were the most influential in determining a successful policy of economic sanctions.  Since the 
impact of the debate was so significant the investigations will be used in determining the 
essential weaknesses of the US sanction regime against Iran.   
Unilateral Vs. Multilateral Sanctions 
 
 Apart from the conditional political and economic variables used in the study, Hufbauer 
et. al. identified several limitations relevant to economic sanctions.  The use of sanctions in the 
proper conditions can lead to its failure by not linking the desires of the sender to the realities of 
the situation.  Goals are poorly defined, the means not effectively implemented, and the 
cooperation of other states not effectively marshaled.  These problems of coordinating 
multilateral sanctions when compared to unilateral sanctions, several studies have shown that 
unilateral sanctions appear more effective (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999, Drezner 2000, Miers 
and Morgan 2002).  Three theories suggest why this is the case.   
 First, the selection effects argument says that the cases of multilateral sanctions are often 
over high profile issues that are of high importance to the parties involved.  The target of a 
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multilateral sanctions regime has more at stake in the issue that is the primary cause of the 
sanctions.  The target state‟s leadership is faced with suffering high domestic costs if seen as 
capitulating to the sender's demands.  Further, a target state‟s may also face the international 
consequences of backing down to the sender's demands.  Thus, target states engaged in disputes 
where issues of importance are at stake have little incentive to capitulate to threats of sanctions 
and are often willing to “go the distance” and incur significant costs if sanctions are imposed.  
Complicating this fact is that the sender does not have perfect information regarding the 
preferences of the target.  Threats can be insufficient, or intelligence inaccurate.  Senders can 
miscalculate and be forced to impose inadequate sanctions that have little chance of success.  
This inadequate option may even be preferred when faced with having to back down against an 
obstinate target.  The selective effect argument states that the reason sanctions do not work is 
because most studies do not account for the cases were the target conceded to the threat of 
sanctions.  Thus reiterating the maximum that the best sanctions are the ones never imposed. 
 Second, the public goods argument states that the coalition of senders contains free-riding 
incentives whereby the supposed higher costs of multilateral sanctions are mitigated by each 
member offsetting the costs of imposing sanctions onto the other senders, thereby diminishing 
the overall punitive cost on the target making it less likely to concede.  Further, imposed 
sanctions distort the domestic politics of the target country in reorganizing economic activity.  
As the target begins to seek new trading partners, states within the sender's coalition find that 
free-riding on the other states enforcement can remove the cost of sanctioning the target by 
maintaining or expanding economic ties.  Here, the damage associated with denying the free-
trade market to the target only produces a mercantilist reaction within the target as economic 
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rents are increased.  Apart from distorting the economic effects of the sender's coalition, the 
target state under sanctions has its negotiating position with states outside the coalition altered as 
well.  The cost of sanctions is that it lowers the value of exports and raises the price of imports.  
States that remained outside the coalition understand the favorable conditions and respond to the 
perverted economic incentives created by the sanctions regime.  Multilateral sanctions are 
important in that it also matters who does not join the sending coalition as much as who does.  
Here, states show their willingness to counter the sending coalition by denying taking part and 
providing the target state leadership with the rationale to resist sanctions (Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg 1999). 
 Third, the spatial theory argument points to the difficulty of unifying the demands and 
preferences of the senders who each have multiple issues at stake.  This multiplicity of issues 
over time leads to each member of the coalition removing its own costs of imposing a sanction 
by coming to terms with the target directly and compromising on the initial motivations of the 
regime.  For multilateral sanctions to be effective in this argument the issues must be narrow so 
that a consensus among all the members is reached as to the purpose of the sanction.  Further, the 
construction of an ad hoc coalition based on a single state‟s preferences is less likely to have the 
necessary mechanisms to ensure issue salience is maintained and effectively enforced.  Thus, 
multilateral sanctions would be more effective if an international institution served as the 
mechanism for conducting the policy (Koehane 1984, Bapat and Morgan 2009).   
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Regime Type and Sanction Effectiveness 
 
 Economic sanctions are not equally effective against all types types of states.  The 
domestic distribution of power among internal factions and structure of the institutions present 
unique challenges to the various sanctions policies that can be imposed.  Reflecting the divide 
between the democratic regime structure and the authoritarian has formed the basis for the 
analysis of how sanctions can be most effectively used to achieve policy goals.  What interests 
the scholarship on the effects of sanctions by regime type are two main factors: how well does a 
specific type of sanction affect the base of support for a target‟s leadership and what structural 
realities within the target‟s government make it most vulnerable?   
 A sanctions regime is intended to impose costs on two main groups within the target 
country, the central leadership and the core groups that support the leadership.  Each state taken 
within its own context is unique in terms of its governing structure and the networks and 
institutions supporting that structure.  While each country may be distinct in its contextual 
variables the overarching goal of enacting economic sanctions is to change the policies of the 
target.  To accomplish this, sanctions can either focus on specific targets within the government 
or the supporting groups outside the government.  Sanctions that target core groups within the 
government are intending to alter the political power by shifting the preferences of the 
leadership.  targeted groups become less valuable to the leadership and the policy preferences 
advocated by those groups become less attractive when tied to the impetus for the sender‟s 
sanctions regime.  sanctions whose purpose is to support opposition groups are intending to 
weaken the entrenched core coalitions and bring about a change in the leadership.  It is the 
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effects that sanctions have on these “microfoundations” within the target state that led scholars to 
examine the context of the potential effects sanctions impose on the domestic political structures 
of the target.  As Kirshner notes this approach focuses not on, “how those sanctions hurt the 
target state, this approach emphasizes how groups within the target are affected differentially, 
and how these consequences change with the form of statecraft chosen” (Kirshner 1997).   
 In this approach to sanctions the type of regime, that is how democratic a regime is, 
reflects how the core groups are distributed within the domestic political context.  The goal of 
economic sanctions is to inflict necessary costs onto the groups most central to the governing 
leaderships base of power.  Democracies tend to have larger and more dispersed groups on which 
leaders rely to stay in power.  The leadership‟s “winning coalition” in a democratic state is 
responsive and expressive to the domestic changes in incentive structures (Bueno de Mequita et. 
al. 2003).  Thus, the goal of sanctions is to affect these groups by imposing costs in a manner that 
can force these core groups to exert pressure on the leadership to yield to the demands of the 
sender.  Robert Pape (1996) asserts that the intended effect of such a policy mirrors that of the 
aerial bombing strategy where a threshold of resistance is present and the imposition of costs is 
widespread among the population of the target.  The goal, therefore is to inflict widespread 
economic costs which translate into direct political costs for the leadership.  When sanctioning a 
democracy the goal is to ensure that as many relevant groups are affected as possible so that the 
response of the citizenry will be to exert its political influence on the leadership.  This can occur 
because of the means available to democratic leaders is limited on enforcing its determination to 
resist the demands of the sender. 
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 The political institutions that govern a democracy are dispersed in their political power, 
responsive to political will of the voters and bound by the legal authority that empowers the 
voters.  Thus, the winning coalition of the democratic state must appeal to the usually large and 
multiple groups of their constituency.  The need for the target‟s leadership to retain these groups‟ 
support to maintain its power means that if a sender can manipulate even a relatively small 
segment of the winning coalition to defect it will increase the pressure on the leadership to yield.  
If the leadership of the target fails to heed to the demands of its dissenting coalition members it 
risks dismantling its own base of support and losing in the next election.  Further, democratic 
leaders lack the capability for direct coercive measures over large portions of the population and 
must respect the consequences of the electoral process.  The responsiveness of elections and the 
lack of coercive measures reflect the diffused power within a democratic state and a prudent 
selection of the type of sanction by the sender can exploit the potential divisions within the 
power base of the targets leaders (Kirshner 1997, Brooks 2002).   
 Authoritarian rulers present a different set of challenges for the sender.  While the 
winning coalition within a democracy tends to be larger and widely dispersed the authoritarian 
leadership often depends on a select group of relatively small core supporters.  The lack of 
responsiveness to the leadership‟s decisions means the accountability in resisting economic 
sanctions is narrower than democratic leaders (Kirshner 1997, Brooks 2002, Allen 2005, 
Lektzian and Souva 2007).  While the groups remain relatively smaller in authoritarian regimes 
than in democracies this does not mean that the core supporters can be insulated from the effects 
of economic sanctions, nor are they any less responsive to the imposed costs.  Yet, the 
institutional structure of authoritarian regimes allows the leadership more options for responding 
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to the costs of sanctions to ensure the target regime can continue to resist the sender‟s demands 
for policy change. 
  The lack of democratic institutions allows authoritarian rulers to avoid the pitfalls 
sanctions present their democratic counterparts in three ways: deflecting the costs of sanctions 
onto politically marginalized groups, manipulating economic structures to punish rivals and 
reward supporters and finally, having more freedom in responding to the distorting economic 
incentives of sanctions.  Authoritarian rulers are not bound to the political will of their 
constituencies in the way found in democracies.  The expression of displeasure by the public has 
limited institutional support structures and individuals face potential coercive measures by the 
punitive apparatuses of the rulers.  Thus, the expression by the general citizenry in resisting the 
damaging effects of sanctions and the policies that triggered them contains a high personal risk 
and faces significant institutional barriers as the costs of suppression are low compared to the 
costs of alleviating discontent (Brooks 2002).  Authoritarian regimes are presented with 
populations that are diverse in their preferences and support for the leadership.  With the rule of 
law being generally weaker in these regimes, the ability of the ruling coalition to manipulate its 
economic structures in response to sanctions is less constrained than in democracies.  
Recognizing this, authoritarian rulers have the ability to reward supporting groups at the expense 
of others as economic rents increase as the perverting effects of sanctions take hold (Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg 1999).  Spreading costs across large groups through economic sanctions against 
a authoritarian leader‟s will not provide the adequate pressure necessary for the leadership to 
capitulate to the senders demands.  If the base of support for the authoritarian rulers is narrower 
then so should the focus of intended costs be for the sanctions employed. 
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 This ability to deflect the costs of sanctions in an advantageous manner means that the 
sanctions policy chosen should focus intently on those with direct influence in the winning 
coalition.  These targeted sanctions are designed not to impose widespread costs, but to inflict 
significant costs on specific actors within the regime.  While Galtung (1967) noticed the famed 
“rally-round-the-flag” effect of sanctions where the population of the target responds with 
solidarity to the rulers its presence in mobilizing support does not appear sustainable (Baker and 
Oneal 2001).  In cases where the authoritarian ruler depends on their populist credentials to 
maintain power the effects of economic sanctions appear to exert the necessary pressure for 
capitulation (Escriba-Folch and Wright 2010).  This, however, does not reflect the vast majority 
of authoritarian rulers and often the coercive mechanisms available to crush dissent remain 
intact.  While general sanctions may work in a limited number of cases the use of targeted 
sanctions to diminish the private rewards on the ruler‟s selected coalition members may exert 
enough pressure to ensure capitulation to the demands of the sender.   
 The use of sanctions against different types of regimes reflects the intended policy goal of 
the sanctions regime and is crafted to inflict costs on the target state.  How best to accomplish 
these goals and which segments of the populations are to be targeted is dependent on the 
domestic structures of the target state.  Generally, democracies with their large winning 
coalitions, dispersed political power and responsive democratic institutions in choosing the 
leadership are more susceptible to the coercive effects of general sanctions that impose costs on a 
larger scale over the targeted population.  Authoritarian regimes with small winning coalitions, 
narrow political bases of power and the lack of democratic responsiveness are more susceptible 
to targeted sanctions affecting a strategically small portion of the society politically relevant to 
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the leadership.  It is important to note that these generalities do not imply that such measures 
guarantee success.  The low rate of sanction successes reflects the poor application of sanctions 
policy as well as the political determination of democratic politics and authoritarian rulers to 
resist economic coercion in most circumstances.  Resistance entails the economic and political 
motivations of the relevant actors to respond to imposed sanctions and the perverted economic 
conditions created by such policies.  In order to investigate these factors the analysis must move 
beyond the generalized typology of states and the associated prudent sanctions policies. 
Black Knights and Sanction Busting 
 
 In the initial analysis on the limitations of sanctions Hufbauer et. al. identified the role of 
“black knights” who could intervene between the sender and target to provide supplementary 
assistance to the target by trading with, facilitating financial transactions for or supplementing  
denied aid to the target.  While the presence of these black knights in sanction busting has been 
observed in various cases, such as in Cuba and the Soviet Union and North Korea and China, an 
exhaustive study was finally taken up by Bryan Early.  In the general study of sanction busting 
Early (2010) looks into which states are most likely to sanction bust and why by focusing on bi-
lateral trade before and after sanctions are imposed.  To examine the motivating factors Early 
develops two models based on realist and liberal theories of international relations.  Realism 
focuses on the political motivations for the third party state in responding to imposed sanctions 
while the liberal places profit and market incentives as being the central factors.   
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 According to the realist interpretations, political leaders are the primary drivers of their 
states‟ trading behaviors.  The classic example of this political motivation in determining the 
direction of trade between states under sanctions is the USSR‟s support to Cuba after the general 
trade embargo imposed by the US after the Castro regimes assumption to power.  In ESR, the 
black knight states are not classified as to the political ties in determining sanction busting 
behavior.  Early (2010) hypotheses that states that have security pacts with the target will be 
more likely to sanction bust, as will states identified as rivals to that of the sender.  Similarly, if a 
third party state has a security pact with the sender it will be less likely to sanction bust, as will a 
rival of the target state. 
 Liberal theories emphasize the role of market interactions as the primary determinant of 
the flows in international trade.  It is the search for profit that determines whether or not the 
firms of a state seek economic opportunities in the international market.  The political factor does 
play a role in that businesses prefer the stability associated with good governance and 
standardized practices in the rule of law.  Sanctions can increase the amount of uncertainty 
within the relationship between the politics between the sender and target.  However, the 
removal of a sender‟s domestic firms from the target creates a vacuum in the market which can 
appeal to the profit incentives for firms located in third party states and override the concerns 
over uncertainty by increasing the returns of trade.  In looking at the case of Cuba after the US 
embargo saw a rise in the politically motivated trade by the USSR, but also saw a rise in the 
trade between Canadian, French and Japanese firms as well.   In mitigating the risks and 
absorbing the influx of exports from the target country large economies are expected to have 
better positions to engage in sanction busting trade.  Political considerations are not lost on the 
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liberal perspective.  As such, the established political ties between the third party state and the 
target foster economic arrangements.  One case that of past colonial ties between the target and 
third party state are expected to foster a sanction busting relationship after sanctions are imposed.   
Apart from purely political ties, the size of the trade between the target and third party state 
matters as well.  Here, states that are more dependent on the trade with the target are more likely 
to sanction bust. 
 Early‟s model focused on the bilateral trade between the target and the third party state 
before and after sanctions were imposed.  His model found significant support for the liberal set 
of hypotheses and only minimal support for the realists.  For the realist perspective the political 
and security pacts formed between the sender and third party states should rule the day when 
deciding whether or not to sanction bust.  The model found that security pacts did motivate 
sanction busting behavior if the third party state had a pact with the target prior to sanctions.  
While a security pact with the sender actually increased the likelihood of sanction busting trade 
to a higher degree than situations with security pacts between the target and third party states.  
Such results seem to suggest that the great power motivations posited by realist theories of 
economic discourse between states are a weak predictor to the profit incentives created by 
imposing economic sanctions.  Early, however, offers some consolations to the realist 
interpretation by accounting for the idea that such third party states engaged in a security pact 
with the sender may be engaging in soft balancing against its potential rival.  Under conditions of 
anarchy members of an alliance cannot fully trust the other states in within its alliance.  Actions 
taken by one state to alter the balance of power through sanctions may induce its rivals to engage 
in counter-balancing behavior.  This is furthered by the fact that rich states are far more likely to 
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impose sanctions on poorer states than the reverse.  Factoring in the liberal perspective, firms 
within the third party state are responding to the potential for profits created by the sender, thus 
the third party state can benefit from the distortions the sender initiated.  Here, the third party 
state is in control of its ability to enforce the sender‟s sanctions or to engage in sanction busting.  
Domestic firms within the third party state can lobby its home leadership to shield themselves 
politically from the sender while both benefit economically from sanction busting.  In combining 
this with the benefits of exploiting the the potentially lucrative trade vacuum exposed by the 
sanctions provides the liberal perspective with a predominant explanatory rationale of sanction 
busting according to Early.   
 The effects of sanction busting trade on the success of economic sanctions has often been 
mitigated by previous statistical studies (Hufbauer et al. 2007, Drury 1998, Drezner 2000, 
Nooruddin 2002) despite the theoretical understanding that such assistance by third party states 
would positively affect the ability of the target in mitigating the costs of sanctions in sustaining 
its resistance.  Early (2011) attribute these findings to an inadequate coding of the original data 
presented by the Hufbauer et al‟s. black knight variable.  In essence, the original variable lacked 
the contextual characters important to influencing the target‟s decision to resist sanctions.  
Namely, the number of parties involved in sanction busting trade, how long the trade persisted 
and the amount of assistance provided.  In line with the liberal interpretation of Early‟s previous 
study (2010) discussed above the economic incentives created by imposing sanctions prompted 
numerous variation in the decisions of multiple states to increase their trade with the target.  The 
formal ties initiated by these third party states are not entirely limited to the political ties to the 
sender and the economic situation created by the sanctions. 
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 Sanctions impose costs on all parties involved in the execution of these policies.  Again, 
the purpose of sanctions is to maximize the costs to the target to accomplish the stated political 
goals.  If the sanctions fail to accomplish this than the potential for the success of the sanctions is 
severely compromised (Hufbauer et al. 2007).  Sender‟s seek to impose costs by denying the 
target access to its exports, which forces the consumers of the sanctioned good to pay higher 
prices as the scarcity of the good increases.  This increases the cost of imports to the target in 
three ways: first, the shock of losing access to the goods; second, the time of finding substitute 
trade partners; third, the increase in price for that good.  The increase in price can either come 
from the privileged bargaining position the buster enjoys, or reflect the cost of avoiding detection 
from the sender.  Sender‟s seek to increase the cost to the target and offset their own domestic 
costs by gaining the support of third party states for their sanctions.   
 Such efforts come with several major hurdles.  First, the costs in gaining support raises 
the cost to the sender and can inhibit the punitive intent of the sanction on the target.  In 
incentivizing third party states the sender raises the costs associated with gaining that support as 
partners frequently request to be compensated for their costs.  This can quickly push the 
cost/benefit calculus out of the operational acceptance to the sender.  Further, the third party 
states that join the coalition now have the possibility to push the responsibility of enforcing the 
sanctions onto other members, free-riding on the costs while reaping the benefits of non 
compliance.  Thus, for each third party state that joins the coalition the benefits gained are 
essentially marginal (Martin 1992, Drezner 2000).   
 The second hurdle is the economic distortions associated with implementing sanctions 
and the change that has on the economic benefits to third party states.  First, given the costs 
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associated with coercing third party states to join the sanction regime target states can exert 
political leverage over third party states that are more dependent on trade with the target than the 
sender can compensate.  This can translate into political leverage that the target can exert through 
the commercial interests of the third party state on the sender in mitigating the severity of 
sanctions (Early 2011).  Next, by restricting the flow of exports to the target the cost of those 
goods rises; this creates the perverting effects on the economic situation within the target: the 
harsher the sanction the greater the cost, which means that the harsher the sanction the more 
profitable trade becomes for sanction busters (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999).  This requires 
the availability of substitute goods in markets independent of the sender; yet, in the modern 
globalized economy the availability of such goods is limited in mostly unique cases.  This is 
compounded in situations where the sanctioned goods are available but the economic incentives 
are lacking.  This politically motivated sanction busting where the direct economic loss is 
compensated through the intended long-term political gain is rare, but still occurs.  Such realist 
motivations of “blood-letting” and soft balancing remain a significant motivator for states 
seeking to affect their rivals, especially in the case of great power rivalry (Mearsheimer 2001, 
Pape 2005).  It should be noted that Early‟s (2010 and 2011) studies found little support for the 
realist interpretations of the politically motivated black knight variable on a significant 
robustness when tested against the profit motivations.   
 The analysis suggests that liberal motivations predominate in formal sanction busting 
trade.  Early reflects that while the outright measurement of the realist interpretations failed to 
gain significant support within the model, this could not discount the perspective entirely, though 
it remains clear that connecting formal security ties to sanction busting behavior in bilateral trade 
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the potential for political sanction busting cannot be thrown out.  Early‟s (2011) findings suggest 
that senders should prioritize anti-busting policies to those state most sensitive to the commercial 
incentives created by those sanctions. 
Domestic Effects of Sanction Busting on the Target 
 
 The primary concern of most analysis of the effect of sanctions is focused on whether the 
conditions are conducive to induce the leadership of the target into compliance.  The essential 
logic is one where the higher the cost the higher the likelihood of concessions.  Considering the 
manner in which the target adapts to sanctions will determine whether the target is capable of 
replacing the costs.  Authoritarian regimes are considered to be better positioned to exploit the 
incentives created by the imposition of sanctions.  This is due to the lack of institutional 
constraints and the lack of democratic responsibilities of despots to their populations.  The 
general effects of sanctions within a target play an important role on the ability to sanction bust. 
 The lack of the rule of law in authoritarian regimes is a prime example of the advantage 
these regimes have at successfully busting sanctions.  Research by Peter Andreas has found that 
sanctions produce a loss in the rule of law in most states regardless of the regime type.  This 
“criminalizing consequence” of sanctions are directly tied to the economic conditions created 
when sanctions are imposed.  The rising demand of sanctioned imports raises the price of those 
goods.  Consequently, incentives for black market providers are pushed to where the costs 
associated with the risk of punishment become lower as the payoffs become larger.  The 
prevalence of smuggling and the acceptance of black markets in responding to sanctions 
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becomes a part of the civil society.  This mirrors the rally–round–the–flag concept where the 
population demonizes the sender and rallies to support the resistance of the target's regime.  This 
may overcome the political objections to the rising costs absorbed by the population as their 
willingness to accept the effects of the sanction providing that the sanctioned goods can be 
acquired. 
 The development of a black market can occur through either private or state-based 
mechanisms.  Private actors can respond effectively to the incentives of sanctions and be better 
positioned to operate outside of the target's borders due to the lack of official governmental ties.  
Previous relationships with international firms do not simply disappear after sanctions are 
imposed, and the connections of international firms in the target can exploit its ties to states less 
committed to the sanction regime.  The responses of private institutions to sanctions still need to 
be aided by the policies of the regime.  The support and cultivation of the black market by 
governmental restructuring also becomes a necessity.  What develops is the ability of 
authoritarians to entrench their position politically and even gain in the informal profits of 
busting.  While the effects on democratic regimes may be pushed to adopting policies at odds 
with the institutions of democratic governance.  The coercive effect spreads regionally as actors 
and neighboring states react to the rise of the black market of the target. 
 The effects on the democratic structures of the economy should be understood by the 
sender's leaders in the context of the goals of the sanction regime.  If the intention is to isolate 
the target's regime than the sender must ensure that the availability of substitute partners for trade 
are limited.  Also, the regional states should be capable of effectively enforcing the sanctions on 
limiting the effectiveness of the black markets ability to sanction bust.  If the goal is regime 
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change then the sender should choose sanctions that do not provide the government the 
opportunity to manipulate the sender's coalition through bargaining with the corresponding rise 
in prices caused by the sanctions.  While the sectors of the target's economy should be chosen by 
the sender to enrich members of the coalitions most favorable to the political solution desired.  If 
the criminalizing effect is unavoidable than it might as well be manipulated to the sender's 
benefit. 
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CHAPTER THREE: IRAN CASE STUDY 
 
 This chapter will present a basic history of the political context of the US sanction regime 
against the Islamic Republic of Iran.  A brief overview of the major events between the two 
nations will provide an understanding of the causes of the hostile relationship.  Beginning after 
the Islamic revolution and the resulting hostage crisis this chapter is divided into three main 
periods covering the major sanctions initiatives by the US, which I term “waves.”  Each wave 
will review the precipitating events to provide a political context for their initiation.  Next, each 
wave will examine the sanctions imposed by the US than the affect of each on Iran.  The 
following chapter will review the entire sanction regime in the context of established sanctions 
literature to explain the failure of US policy in achieving the stated goals of the sanction regime.  
By highlighting the weaknesses of the resulting US sanction regimes the analysis will examine 
the response of  Iran to “bust” the sanctions. 
A Sanction Regime Implies Intransigence between the Sender and Target 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze the context of sanction busting.  The first part of 
this analysis is to establish the political climate of the relationship between the US and Iran that 
led to the imposition of sanctions.  Almost by definition the enacting of a sanctions regime 
implies an impasse in the relationship between two states.  While the provocation is perhaps over 
a single incident or issue the situation cannot be removed from the historical trends.  In the case 
of Iran, US sanctions have continued for over three decades and revolved around two main 
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issues: Iranian support of terrorist groups and the nuclear program.  The stalemate between the 
negotiations on these issues forms the main political context for the sanction regime‟s 
persistence.  The intransigence on these issues has two main factors: the domestic political 
climate of each country and the issue‟s salience among the leadership.  These factors have 
poisoned the relationship and produced a dynamic lacking the compromise necessary to justify 
ending the sanctions. 
 The story of the domestic political situation involving the US and Iran are closely linked.  
Iran, possessing vast fossil fuel deposits, is of strategic importance for the US whose citizens use 
more fossil fuels per capital than any other state.  The US gained the access to the Iranian market 
by way of British companies that were established there prior to WWII.  For Iran, possessing 
such a vast amount of a valuable commodity comes with the usual trappings: corruption, 
profiteering and heavy involvement by other states.  The abuse of power by the ruling class of 
Iran, enabled by their arrangements with Western MNCs, led to several political backlashes.  The 
most famous was the rise to Prime Minister of Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1951, who swiftly 
carried out progressive reforms and nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later British 
Petroleum, BP) in an effort to limit foreign control of Iranian resources.  Mosaddegh reached too 
far as the scale and momentum of his political and economic agenda began to alienate him 
domestically and provoked consternation in the West.  The political demands for an equitable 
share of the oil revenue and social reforms carried Mosaddegh to power, but through the 
maneuvers by the established elites, aided by US and British covert assistance, he was arrested 
and eventually marginalized from power.  The fame of CIA involvement in the coup, known as 
Operation Ajax, became an infamous example of Western colonial corruption.   For the Iranian 
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people, Operation Ajax became a symbol for distrusting the motivations of Western powers after 
the newly reinstated Shah Reza Phalavi furthered Iranian cooperation with the West in the 
following decades.   
 In the Shah the US thought it had a leader it could count on: secular, capitalist and 
committed to the concept of modernization.  The Shah‟s rule lacked the turbulence of democratic 
representation that led to the rise of Mosaddegh and the nationalistic policies aimed against 
Western interests.  However, the discontent of the Iranian public over the continued Western 
involvement did not cease.  The marginalized political factions within Iran having been denied 
democratic expression, burdened by poor implementation of the Shah‟s economic policies and 
facing growing inequality began to mobilize in opposition.  The Shah responded to this dissent 
with a policy of brutal and sustained repression that weakened his legitimacy among the wider 
Iranian public.  In the growing brutality of the repression, the view of the Shah as beholden to the 
West‟s economic agenda and a secular philosophy of governing combined into the main 
grievances for the highly motivated opposition.  The inability of the Shah to handle the growing 
discontent, and a general lack of political ability to exploit the mosaic nature of the opposition 
led to a widespread revolt and his eventual overthrow.  The anger and frustration directed at the 
Shah and his Western backers that motivated the revolutionaries found its most acute expression 
in the storming of the US embassy and the taking of 52 American hostages. 
 The seeds of Iranian distrust were laid many decades before this incident, but for the 
American political consciousness Iran was no longer an anonymous state half a world away and 
famous for its beautiful carpets.  In the eyes of US leaders the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini and 
the hardline taken against the US in the negotiations that followed the taking of the American 
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hostages, Iran was now a country of dangerous religious fanatics whose doctrine was now 
fundamentally opposed the US.  In the context of the Cold War, Iran was now opposed the 
cultural conflict between the US and USSR and thus rejected and sought to overthrow the 
“American way of Life.”  Further emphasizing this was the disregard of traditions of immunity 
for a state‟s diplomatic community.  Yet, these all pale in the perception that a country which 
regarded itself as a superpower was powerless to stop the humiliation of its own citizens from 
being used as propaganda by a regime openly hostile to its agenda.  The rhetoric of both sides 
fueled this rise in tensions throughout the hostage crisis.   
 Leaders in the Iranian Revolution had a politically useful tool to stoke a popular anti-US 
sentiment among the population.   Heading into the 1980 elections, Republican leaders in the US 
used the hostage crisis to inflate the risk posed by the Islamic Revolution and exploit the 
perceived weakness of President Jimmy Carter‟s inability to “get the hostages back.”  The results 
of the crisis left an indelible imprint on the relations between the two countries.  In the public 
sphere, the populations of both Iran and the US had very public and dramatic events for which 
they could directly lay the blame at the doorstep of the other state.  The leaders of both states 
exploited the political benefits by fanning the flames of a threat hysteria directed at the other.  
This, in turn, led to a domestic situation in which the political factions in each state could not 
exploit the side of reconciliation without being accused of weakness towards an existential and 
unremitting threat.   
 What characterizes the interactions between the US and the IRI are the adoption of 
policies directly motivated by the strategic culture of opposing the each other in all facets of 
international diplomacy.  Leaders of both countries have adopted policies that are predicated on 
 37 
 
the understanding that the other‟s ideology is illegitimate and its motivation is suspect.  The 
sanction regime imposed by the US is not the cause of this mistrust, but a reinforcing symptom 
that has led to the current stalemate surrounding the issues of Iranian support for terrorism and 
the transparency of its nuclear program.  The sanctions logic suggests that if the penalties and 
costs imposed on a target state are severe enough, then it is in the state‟s interests to concede.  
Such a rational conception of political calculations ignores the context of the states involved in 
the struggle.   
 The importance of the issue to a country's political leaders combined with the nature of 
the relationship between the sender and target may override the basic material considerations 
when deciding whether or not to concede to sanctions.  It is difficult to say which is more 
important than the other: the importance of the issue and its ideological context or the political 
costs of yielding to an enemy.  Suffice it to say that both factors combine into a powerful 
political force for the leadership in both the sender and the target.  For the sender, this entails the 
extent of the willingness to impose costs on itself, motivating the political will in enacting the 
scope of sanctions and defining the harshness of its punishment.  For the target, this entails the 
willingness to endure the costs, motivating the political support to resist the sender and defining 
the methods of how the population lives under coercive effects of sanctions.  Thus, the issue for 
the sender is thus: can material costs be imposed that exceed the political will of the target to 
resist our coercion?  As to the general conception of the “political will” is not a uniform variable 
and is defined by the political and social factors unique to each state.  Such factors include the 
relative size of the target economy, the type of regime and the political stability of the target.  
Regarding the extent of the costs imposed on Iran by the US sanctions regime will be examined 
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further in this chapter.  One preliminary judgment can be stated here: it has not been enough to 
reverse the Iranian leadership positions on the issues surrounding the sanctions. 
 The US sanction regime is seeking to punish Iran over two main issues: supporting 
“terrorist” groups abroad, especially around Israel, and the lack of institutional openness in the 
Iran‟s nuclear program to mitigate concerns over the potential for its weaponization.  Indeed, 
from the US perspective these issues are closely tied.  Iran‟s support of Hezbollah in Lebanon 
and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories are associated with the armed resistance to Israel and 
US allies within the Lebanese political system.  The means of resistance for these groups has 
often been asymmetrical in nature, used violence against soft and civilian targets as a primary 
strategy and are often clandestine in their tactics.  In organizing and supporting such campaigns 
around Israel the Iranian regime has declared itself against the Arab agreements which recognize 
the right of Israel to exist.  Combining this stance with a hyperbolic religious rhetoric associated 
with the language and culture of resisting Israeli policies has led hawkish policy makers in the 
US and Israel to a worst case scenario approach.  One where the Iranian leadership would have 
little compunction in using a nuclear weapon to further its goals around the Israeli issue.  It 
should be said that while the rhetoric of Hamas and Hezbollah who are directly engaged in the 
struggle against Israel, the leadership of the Iran have not mirrored the unequivocally violent 
language of these groups. 
 This, of course, matters little to the Israel and its allies.  The fact that US and Iranian 
support allies who often engage in outbreaks of violence is the predominating factor that comes 
to define those who support the sides involved.  This occurs both ways, just as the US views the 
violence perpetrated by Hamas and Hezbollah on Israeli targets and can attribute this to the 
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support provided by Iran; so can Iran view the incursions by the Israeli military into the 
Palestinian Territory and Lebanon as based on the backing of the US.  The Israel/Palestine 
conflict is the predominant issue that encompasses a microcosm of the mistrust between the US 
and Iran which contributes to the continued stalemate around the continued imposition of further 
sanctions.   
 The US is distrustful of Iranian motivations and is at odds with the strategy of supporting 
groups to resist Israeli policies.  This distrust is profound in that the attainment of a nuclear 
weapon implies its eventual use against Israel.  The certainty of the future use of nuclear 
weapons is, of course, unknowable.  The threat created by the mistrust and demonization of the 
opponent is more important to creating a hostile dynamic between the states involved in an 
irresolvable sanction cycle.  The importance of this is that it substantiates both the US policy of 
sanctions and Iranian policy to resist.  Thus, both states have taken a position in which they 
cannot back down; to do so implies that the ideological justifications are, in a sense, invalid and 
the commitments to your allies are cynical and transitory.  Such a position is difficult to justify to 
a domestic population and may come with political consequences to the ruling elite. 
The First Wave: 1979-1994 
 
 There have been three distinct periods that come to define the US‟s sanctions regime 
against Iran: the early years, 1980-1994; the middle years, 1995-2005, the late years 2006-the 
present.  Each period contains unique measures taken by the US to further the economic pressure 
on the Iranian regime.  It should be noted that the sanction periods are not static in that the 
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policies enacted at the outset of the period continue unchanged throughout the years covered.  
Rather, the sanctions “evolved” in the sense that future sanctions respond to the failures of the 
current policies.  The evolution of the policy has been underpinned by the “essential framework” 
laid out in the first wave of sanctions.  This framework is built on the two track policy of opening 
negotiations while simultaneously increasing the costs to Iran (Takeyh and Maloney 2011, 1298-
99).  Each wave of sanctions expanded the previous measures, continuing the expanding scale of 
sanctions in an effort to impose more costs on the target. 
 The disruption of friendly relations between the US and Iran brought about by the events 
of the Islamic Revolution also saw the first round of sanctions imposed.  In the process of the 
negotiations surrounding the hostage crisis the US imposed several restrictions on the economic 
ties between the two states.  These sanctions were tied to the release of the hostages and were 
subsequently dismantled after the US secured the return of its citizens.  The invasion of Iran by 
Iraq formed the predominant strategic context for US policy following the hostage crisis.  Iran, 
meanwhile, began to realize its revolutionary ideology in areas where large Shiite communities 
were located throughout the Middle East.  The War years were followed by period of distraction 
for the US and of reconstruction for Iran.  Still, the resumption of the Iranian nuclear program 
brought the focus of the US on Iran after the resolution of the first Gulf War.  The subsequent 
defeat and embargoes on Iraq forced the US to reconcile the improved geopolitical position of 
Iran in the region.  Furthered by Iranian provocations, the US evaluated the conditions of the 
sanctions regime and began to construct the second wave of sanctions.  This section will look at 
this initial phase encompassing the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and 
the years leading up to the second wave of sanctions. 
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 The first round of sanctions came in November 1979.  The first sanction was an 
impounding of military aid scheduled to leave for Iran under the authority of the Arms Export 
Control Act.  The aid, which had been paid for under the Shah‟s regime, was valued at over $300 
million (Alikhani 2000, 66).  This sanction also embargoed any future sales of military 
equipment to Iran.  Next, the Carter administration placed a ban on all oil imports from Iran 
under the powers of the Export Administration Act.  The intention of this sanction was to disrupt 
the Iranian regime‟s foreign exchange earnings from the U S, which amounted to about $13 
million a day.  Following this, President Carter signed Executive Order (EO) 12170 which 
placed an asset freeze on Iranian foreign deposits in all US banks.  The freeze covered all 
governmental assets held within US government oversight.  This included close to $1.4 billion of 
deposits and securities held with the Federal Reserve System, as well as 1.63 million ounces of 
gold.  By far the largest measure was to impound funds and securities held by US banks totaling 
some $7.5 billion.  The asset freeze, however, was not intended to be a general ban on normal 
economic activity.  This continued albeit at a continually shrinking pace.  Still, the asset freeze 
was the largest since the US freeze of German assets at the beginning of World War II (Alikhani, 
ch. 3). 
 In the initial round of sanctions the US enjoyed perhaps its most favorable position 
regarding Iran.  The Shah‟s regime relied heavily on US economic policy and aid and as such the 
imposition of sanctions had their largest impact.  In cutting off governmental financial assistance 
the Carter administration sought to deny Iran the benefits of their relationship with the US with 
no compunction about canceling the arrangements made and paid for during the Shah‟s regime.  
The US impounded all military technology not yet delivered and did not refund the costs already 
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paid.  These sanctions contained clear costs to Iran still in the process of consolidating and 
formalizing a new government, but the Iranian leadership had previously committed themselves 
to limiting the role of the US in Iranian affairs.  It became apparent that the new Iranian regime 
took seriously the Iranian people‟s frustration with Western involvement in domestic affairs and 
was willing to accept the short term loss of the November 1979 round of sanctions.  Another 
reason the revolutionary leaders were willing to accept this loss was the failure of the Carter 
administration to gain multilateral support for the oil import embargo. Great Britain, Germany 
and Japan all received more than 10% of their crude from Iran and were unwilling to endure the 
costs of joining an import embargo on Iranian crude (Alikhani, 71-2).  With this failure to 
resolve the hostage crisis the Carter administration began to construct a second round of 
sanctions. 
 This second round of sanctions, enacted in April of 1980, was the last economic weapon 
available to the US.  The signings of EO's 12205 & 12211 effectively embargoed all imports and 
exports to and from Iran.  These executive orders also prohibited all financial transactions public 
and private, and placed a general travel ban for all US citizens.  While the seeming severity of 
these sanctions sought to impose high costs to the Iranian regime they did not have the intended 
damning effect on the Iranian economy.  Oil revenues coming from US companies in the months 
before the Shah's removal averaged around $280 million per month.  In the months before the 
taking of US hostages, October 1979, oil revenues were down to only $26 million per month, 
and by April 1980, $1.4 million (Alikhani, 79).  The reality of the Carter administration's failure 
to inflict potent economic costs on the Iranian regime resulted in the desperate Operation Eagle 
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Claw.  The failed military operation to rescue the hostages only embarrassed President Carter 
and the negotiations stalemated during the summer of 1980. 
 While the US at the start of the hostage crisis seemed to be in an advantageous position 
for enacting a successful policy of economic coercion the reality was more complicated.  The 
anger and distrust at Western imperialism within the context of the Islamic Revolution brought to 
power revolutionary leaders that were committed to removing all US influence from Iran.  This 
removal would occur no matter the economic costs associated by such a policy.  The Carter 
administration, in assuming that the Iranian regime valued its economic and political ties to the 
US, did not understand the commitment of the revolutions leaders to it‟s anti-imperial agenda.  
The political animosity between the US and Iran only furthered the standoff, were it not for the 
Iraqi invasion in September 1980 there seems little the US could have done to force the Iranian 
hand in the hostage negotiations.   
 The invasion by Iraq exacerbated the economic effects of the US sanctions and the 
revolutionary leader‟s attempts to decouple Iran from its Western economic connections.  US 
sanctions had cut oil revenues to the newly formed regime which cut government revenue 
already constrained by the asset freeze.  The trade boycotts fueled inflation by cutting off foreign 
currency flows and causing the rise in prices of sanctioned goods from re-exporters around the 
gulf.  The sanction contributed to the turbulent events of the revolution which sent the Iranian 
economy into a downturn based on several factors.  First, was the loss the loss of trained 
personal, both foreign and Iranian hampered Iranian manufacturing, which were operating 
around roughly 30-40% in June of 1980.  Next is attributed to the desire to remove Western 
firms‟ involvement which included the difficult challenge of nationalizing and consolidating 
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industries and the interruption of supplies for semi-finished projects by canceling many of the 
Shah‟s large scale economic plans (Miyagawa 1992, 156-7).  The decision of Iran‟s 
revolutionary leaders to disengage its economy from the West was understood to come with 
economic costs, the sanctions implemented by the Carter Administration did exacerbate these 
conditions and restrict the freedom of action in responding to the economic downturn.  Little 
headway was made in the negotiations until the Iraqi invasion presented Iran with an urgent 
requirement to fight the war: cash.  The financial constraints on the Iranian economy caused by 
its own policies and the pressure of US sanctions were only fully realized when the mobilization 
for war had begun.  Only when faced with the coming revenue crisis and potential insolvency did 
the Iranian leaders begin to comply with good faith measures in negotiations (Miyagawa 1992, 
182-6).   
 The importance of the Iranian financial situation formed the backbone of the Algiers 
Accords which secured the release of the hostages.  In exchange for the hostages the US 
removed all trade sanctions, returned $2.8 billion in assets, and placed the financial relations of 
Iran back to normal.  To settle the numerous claims against Iran from the revolutionary economic 
policies and the hostage crisis itself the accord established the US-Iran Claims Tribunal which 
sought to resolve the various disputes.  The tribunal remained the only official mechanism for 
interaction between the two governments for the following years (Takeyh and Maloney 2011, 
1299).  
  Following the resolution of the hostage crisis the US sought to observe how the IRI 
would fare in the war, and whether its revolutionary rhetoric would translate into diplomatic 
policy.  The first years of the war led to an eventual stalemate by 1984, which came with a 
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significant human and economic cost.  Preserving the stalemate became the strategic goal of the 
Reagan Administration and the development of the sanctions regime previously dismantled by 
the Algiers Accord was constructed to serve this goal.  Two major provocations during this 
period of the war shaped US sanctions policy during this time.  First, the bombing of the Marine 
barracks in Lebanon by Hezbollah which the US ultimately laid responsibility on Iran.  The 
Reagan Administration used this event to categorize Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism which 
imposed export controls on all military sales from US based companies, prohibited US aid and 
required US positions in international financial organizations to decline any aid or loans.  The 
widening of the sanctions under the designation of Iran as a state sponsor of terror continued in 
various measures throughout the 1980‟s (O‟Sullivan 2003, 49). 
 The second major provocation revolved around the rising tensions between the Iranian 
naval mining of the Persian Gulf.  In response, President Reagan signed the largely symbolic EO 
12613 which embargoed all imported crude from Iran.  This executive order, was symbolic 
largely because direct imports of Iranian crude by US firms was minuscule.  The order did not 
prohibit US firms from purchasing Iranian crude, refining that crude in foreign locations and 
then importing the resulting products into the US.  This represented a major failure in US policy 
due to the lack of ability of the US to further impose unilateral costs on the Iranian regime while 
incurring significant economic costs for itself.  The political calculations of the Reagan 
Administration in this instance cannot be discounted.  Embarrassed in the aftermath of the Iran 
Contra scandal, the administration was eager to prove its anti-Iranian credentials while still 
ensuring the rough stalemate between the two combatants.  In playing Iran and Iraq off each 
other the US did succeed in that neither side achieved a superior geopolitical position after the 
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cease-fire in 1988.  The consequence for the US sanctions in terms of economic coercion was a 
regime that was a largely ineffective policy in terms of coercing Iranian behavior to comply with 
US demands, chiefly the end of support for terrorist groups around the Middle East.  The 
sanctions also failed to impose significant costs due to the lack of economic trade between Iran 
and the US. 
 After the sanctions associated with the hostage crisis were lifted normal economic 
relations did not return and trade between the US and Iran never equaled the value reached 
during the Shah‟s reign.  While the US, in principle, allowed exports to enter the Iranian market, 
the flow of goods remained significantly lower than when compared to pre-revolution levels 
(Takeyh and Maloney 2011, 1300).  The same is true for US imports from Iran, mainly in the 
form of crude oil.  The difficulty, however, is in figuring the costs imposed by the sanctions 
during this time as Iran was engaged in a war of attrition with Saddam‟s Iraq throughout most of 
the 1980‟s.  EO 12613 signed by Reagan in 1987 did ban the direct import of Iranian crude, but 
allowed Us firms a free hand in transporting, refining and selling the products.  The result was a 
largely limited short-term cost which eventually became a medium-term gain for Iran as US 
companies gradually became the largest purchasers of Iranian crude by the mid 1990‟s 
(O‟Sullivan 2003, 65).  The Reagan era sanctions were mostly in response to specific 
provocations and not part of a larger strategy to coerce Iranian cooperation on selected issues.  
Rather, the desire of the US was to ensure that the uninterrupted flow of oil could continue while 
the war raged on in a stalemate. It was not until the US upset the balance between the two states 
after the resolution of Iraq‟s failed invasion of Kuwait that the specter of a recovering Iran 
loomed as a strategic challenge to US interests. 
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 The US sanctions regime of the Reagan Administration up to the end of the first gulf war 
was primarily a set of half-hearted measures that essentially formed around the already tarnished 
economic relationship between the US and Iran.  While the US had taken a hard stance in cutting 
military sales and aid, the revelation of the Iran-Contra affair revealed the duplicitous nature of 
US covert policies towards the end of the Cold War.  These measures in limiting the formal sale 
of military technology did represent the strongest unilateral measures taken by the US and 
imposed costs primarily in terms of military capacity and less on economic costs.  The bans on 
selling Iran military aid soon encompassed high-tech goods and sophisticated computer systems 
which could have uses within supporting military capability and the reconstruction of the 
Bushehr nuclear facility.  These sanctions were highly selective and had limited impact in terms 
of costs while the slow pace of commercial trade mirrored the substantial drop in volume of trade 
initiated by the war effort.  
 Both the Iranian and US leadership by the end of the wars with Iraq had politically 
denounced the other so that any resumption of economic ties seemed impossible.  The US had no 
credible carrot to offer Iran, and US support of Iraq and the brutal tactics during the war meant 
that the Iranian leadership had no interest in any serious US offer of a cessation of hostilities.  As 
the political climate shifted after the fall of the USSR the US viewed Iran in a different context, 
that of a rogue state whose opposition to the hegemonic position of the US over regional issues 
like Israel and post Gulf War Iraq would form the basis for a reformulation of US strategy and an 
eventual tightening of the sanctions regime.   
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The Second Wave: 1995-2005 
 
 The imposition of the second wave of sanctions on Iran by the US was a response to 
several factors: first, the continued threat mongering from both states; second, the changing role 
of the US in the post-Cold War system and the strengthened position of Iran following the first 
Gulf War; third, the continued progress of Iranian nuclear capability; fourth, Iran‟s organizing of 
obstructive policies in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  The relationship during this period 
between the US and Iran was dominated by a continued lack of trust.  While both regimes 
focused on policies surrounding the turbulent events of the Soviet collapse and proceeded to 
define their place in the new reality, the possibility of reconciliation remained an impossibility.  
The US, whose interests now shifted from bi-polar struggle to system maintaining hegemon, 
struggled to define its role in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse.  Saddam Hussein's 
invasion of Kuwait provided a clear moral cause and posed a strategic challenge to US interests 
in the Gulf region.  The First Gulf War ended with the US militarily crippling Iraq and then 
imposing severe sanctions and an internationally monitored no-fly zone over the marginalized 
Iraqi dictator.  A weakened Iraq tipped the local balance of power directly towards Iran.  Shortly 
after the US invasion Iran began tentative purchases of advanced weaponry to shore up its 
position over its hindered neighbor.  The acquisitions soon caught the attention of US leaders and 
resulted in further restrictions on dual-use technology sales to Iran (Alikhani 2000, 162; Maloney 
2003, 77).  More importantly, the moves further confirmed US foreign-policy hawks eager to 
confirm the strategic narrative of an impending Iranian threat. 
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   The reality of a rise in Iranian power in the region was expressed in two main areas.  
First, the push of Iran in seeking contractors to complete the Bushehr nuclear facility deepened 
US suspicion as to the ultimate goal of the program.  Iran maintained a persistent legal strategy 
to finalize the contract disputes stemming from the cancellations of contracts following the 
immediate aftermath of the Islamic Revolution.  By the mid 1990‟s the Iranian program was 
engaging the severely cash strapped Russian nuclear program for assistance and making 
overtures to the post-Soviet states in Central Asia (Alikhani 2000, 191).  Second, the resolution 
of the Lebanese Civil War presented Iran with a unique opportunity to exert its influence in close 
proximity to Israel.  Hezbollah, the Shiite militia turned political party, began to gain significant 
influence in Lebanese politics.  The US, still upset over the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, saw 
the development as a direct affront towards its goals for a peace settlement between Israel and 
Palestine.  Combined with the diplomatic strategy of Iran aimed at opposing the US led peace 
process suggested that the US needed to reevaluate its strategy regarding the growing influence 
of Iran (Takeyh and Maloney 2011, 1303).   
 The first step in the change of US sanctions policy towards Iran came in 1992.  The Iran-
Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act sponsored by Sen. John McCain signaled the shifting towards a 
more multilateral strategy (Takeyh and Maloney 2011; Alikhani 2000; O‟Sullivan 2003).  
Motivated by the power shifts in the Middle East, and suspicions about announcements by 
Iranian leadership about the desire to complete the Bushehr nuclear facility the US acted.  The 
sanctions put restrictions on foreign military sales and widened the scope of trade labeled as dual 
use technology.  These sanctions also required the imposition of sanctions on any person or 
country which transferred the technology to Iran.  This measure, however, was never fully 
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applied.  Regulations for the act were never issued, but the act justified US pressure on the newly 
formed post Soviet states whose nuclear capabilities were a prime target of this legislation 
(Alikhani 2000, 165). 
 By the mid 1990‟s the US had little left domestically from which it could unilaterally 
deny the Iranian economy as punishment.  The sanctions regime instituted by the US only 
mirrored the reality that even though US firms could trade with Iran following the hostage crisis, 
few actually did so.  With trade levels between the US and Iran in the early 1990„s below 10% of 
the 1970‟s average the position of the US to coerce Iranian behavior by restricting access to the 
US market was a hollow threat.  In terms of the non-oil sector Iranian exports remained virtually 
non-existent in the share of total US imports.  US and Iranian firms intent on obtaining products 
from other simply bypassed restrictions by routing products through the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and other third party states.  In the 1970„s trade with the UAE accounted for less than 4% 
of the trade volume with Iran; after US sanctions, trade grew to 18% in 1988 and averaged 10% 
throughout the mid 1990„s (Askari et al. 2003, 197-99).  While the non-oil sector remained a 
considerably small export market for the IRI the second round of US sanctions sought to impact 
the heavily centralized Iranian government dependent on oil revenue.  The restrictions placed on 
US oil firms from directly purchasing Iranian crude, while still allowed to import the refined 
products of Iranian crude, had little impact in restricting Iran‟s ability to sell its high quality 
crude.  This ability to find alternate markets does not mean that Iran enjoyed a free hand in 
developing its energy resources. 
 Iran‟s oil production has yet to reach output levels equal to that under the Shah in the 
thirty years since the Islamic Revolution.  This loss of production capacity was caused by the 
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loss of the foreign management and operational technicians who left after the hostility facing 
international oil firms during the revolution.  Oil production was further impaired by the Iraqi 
invasion.  The war diverted development funds as neglected facilities were damaged throughout 
the country (Askari et. al. 2003, 179-81).  In coming out of the war, Iran had stabilized its oil 
production and began repairing the facilities damaged or necessarily neglected during the war.  
By 1995, US companies were purchasing 600,000 barrels of Iran‟s 2.6 million daily production.  
Though the sanctions on the Iranian oil sector during the hostage crisis did disrupt Iranian 
production, the nationalizing of the oil companies countered by self imposing restrictions on 
foreign control over the oil extracting process.  The leaders of the Islamic Revolution understood 
the highly fungible oil resources would attract buyers willing to settle on their own terms within 
reason.  The highly nationalistic policies centralized the operation of all domestic oil assets and 
ensured all revenue would flow to the government and not foreign firms.  While Iran required 
new international buyers for its crude following the US sanctions, it's determined policy of 
national control over oil operations and foreign investment capital helped offset the loss of pre-
revolution US oil purchases. 
 The US‟s sanctions during the first phase amounted to Iran suffering some short term 
costs, while mitigating the intended long terms costs.  Thus, while US leaders talked tough 
regarding Iran, the ability to impose significant costs on the regime remained outside the political 
capability throughout the first wave of sanctions.  The rise of US trade following the first Gulf 
War and oil companies continued exploitation of the exemptions on purchasing Iranian crude 
began to draw the attention of more hawkish members of the U.S. Congress.  The hypocrisy 
between the antagonistic rhetoric and the leniency of the sanctions regime eventually confronted 
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the reality of the resurgent Iranian diplomacy organized in opposing the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process.  By the beginning of the Clinton Administration the political landscape within the US 
had seized upon this contradiction and sought to rectify the weaknesses of the sanctions regime. 
 The disconnect between the political rhetoric of conflict between the two nations and the 
continuing of economic ties was not lost on American politicians sensitive to the rise of Iranian 
influence in the Israeli Peace Process.  The influential American Israeli Public Affairs 
Committee (AIPAC) circulated a white paper entitled, Comprehensive US Sanctions Against 
Iran: A Plan for Action.  This document highlighted the hypocritical stance of the continued 
economic engagement with Iran by US firms, and the growing international market engaging in 
the development of Iran‟s energy sector.  The paper called for not only a ban on all US trade with 
Iran, but for sanctions to be imposed on firms and governments that purchased Iranian energy or 
invested in developing future projects.  Picked up in the US Congress by Senator Alfonse 
D‟Amato and Rep. Peter King the two lawmakers led the effort to pass the most comprehensive 
US sanctions against a country since the Cuban Revolution (Alikhani 2000, ch. 6). 
 The push for new legislation faced several challenges.  The Clinton Administration was 
not particularly eager to enact such harsh penalties on US firms so soon out of a recession.  
Clinton struggled to gain executive control over how and who would be sanctioned while the 
senator D'Amato sought clear and unequivocal guidelines for penalties.  Intending to offset the 
demands for a stringent sanctions regime, President Clinton sought to keep the implementation 
of any new sanctions within the confines of previous legislative authority.  As the details of the 
harsh penalties in D‟Amato‟s bill came to light a growing discontent among US allies lobbied for 
 53 
 
their removal.  Clinton sought to find a middle way in the legislation that balanced the desire to 
appear tough on Iran with not losing US allies support for future policy initiatives regarding Iran.     
 The political rhetoric between D‟Amato and Clinton officials regarding the toughness of 
the latter‟s stance towards Iran suddenly faced the announcement of the National Iranian Oil 
Company‟s (NIOC) agreement with the US oil firm Conoco for a $1 billion deal in developing 
the Sirri-A and Sirri-E offshore natural gas fields (Alikhani 2000, ch. 6; Takeyh and Maloney 
2011)  Despite the potential for a possible diplomatic opening, this was the first contract awarded 
to an American firm by the IRI since the revolution, American leaders had positioned themselves 
in the opposite strategic direction for the possible signal of reconciliation by the Rafsanjani 
Administration.  As a result, the Clinton Administration was publicly embarrassed and the 
perception of hypocrisy was devastatingly leveled by D‟Amato.  The result was EO‟s 12957 & 
12959 that banned all trade and investment with Iran‟s oil sector and prohibited all trade with 
Iran including the refined products exemption.  This fulfilled the main objective by the AIPAC 
white paper, but the secondary objective had yet to be decided. 
 The fallout of the Conoco deal highlighted the interconnectedness of the IRI‟s energy 
economy with that of the US and its major trade partners.  The conglomerate energy firm Total 
received the new contract; with the firm‟s nebulous holdings stretching throughout the Americas, 
Europe and the Middle East the ability to enact truly punishing sanctions against the IRI would 
have to address the international nature of the modern economy.  The main thrust of this effort 
was to impose unilateral secondary boycotts on foreign firms that did business with Iran.  The 
sectors affected were not merely energy firms, but included banking, manufacturing and high 
tech firms as well.  The push for secondary sanctions against Iran faced an uphill battle as the 
 54 
 
push for free trade had been used as a neoliberal fountainhead of the post-Cold War order 
(Takeyh and Maloney 2011, 1302).  To enact a set of punitive trade controls based on the 
political motivations of a single state threatened many of the principles put forward by US 
leadership for a generation.  The sanctions faced stiff opposition from foreign firms and 
governments, as well as challenges against the US through the World Trade Organization.   
 The US brushed off the concerns as the Clinton Administration planned to include a 
similar exceptions provision to be held within the executive branch and to exclude foreign firms 
from the more punitive measures of the looming sanctions legislation working its way through 
congress.  Clinton, facing a reelection campaign as the comprehensive sanctions legislation 
gained support, continued to insist on the ability to sanction Iran without the need of such harsh 
legislative action.  Supporters of the legislation led to a campaign that highlighted the resurgent 
Iranian nuclear program, its opposition to Israel and a general human rights abuses spotlight 
campaign to stoke public opinion into supporting the harsh rhetoric against the IRI.  Clinton was 
now faced with being outmaneuvered by the supporters of the legislation and focused his 
negotiations with Congress on securing the exemptions powers while convincing lawmakers of 
his commitment to see the sanctions through (Alikhani 2000, ch. 6).  The result of this process 
was the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA). 
  The passage of the ILSA represented a watershed in US sanctions policy and was met 
with stringent resistance by US allies in the EU, Japan and Canada all of whom continued 
economic relations with Iran after the Islamic Revolution.  In 1995, the EU exported $11.5 
billion in goods to Iran while importing $18 billion, the secondary boycott threatened by the 
ILSA would disrupt the ongoing trade between firms in the US, the EU and Iran (Alikhani 2000, 
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325).  The provisions of the ILSA required the executive branch to acquire information from 
firms doing business with Iran to determine if a sanctionable act had occurred.  In protest, the EU 
instructed its firms to not comply with these provisions.  Further, the ILSA also allowed firms to 
submit potential agreements with Iran for a non-binding judgment as to its potential as 
sanctionable under the law; the EU also instructed its firms not to submit such documents.  For 
two years EU leaders fought against the ILSA, until the Clinton Administration finally reached a 
compromise in late 1998.  The US allowed the French firm Total, and all subsidiaries involved, 
to continue its salvaged Conoco development deal unhindered by the application of the ILSA 
(Alikhani 2000, ch. 8).   
 The sanctions put forward by the ILSA took steps to discourage trade by third-party 
states with Iran.  The effect of the sanctions was termed “secondary boycotts," meaning that the 
intended targets of the sanctions were foreign firms that did business with both the US and Iran.  
A firm could be sanctioned by making an investment of more than $20 million or more in the 
development of Iranians petroleum resources in any one-year period.  This included the sale or 
transfer of any type of good, service or technology relevant to the Iranian energy sector.  
Penalties for violating the ILSA included the denial of any US government procurement, the 
canceling and non-issue of any export licenses to the firm and punitive restrictions to be placed 
with US financial institutions.  At the time of its passing, ILSA threatened several current 
negotiations between US ally‟s oil companies and the Iranian government.  However, after the 
initial agreements reached between the Clinton administration and various European, Japanese 
and Russian firms concerning deals threatened by the ILSA, there have been no sanctions issued 
since the act's passage.  Several deals concerning the Iran's South Pars gas field involving Total, 
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Gazprom and Petronas were judged to be sanctionable under the provisions of the ILSA, but the 
State Department negotiated a waiver based on gaining increased cooperation in combating anti-
proliferation and anti-terrorist policies (Kozhanov 2011, 147). 
 The second wave of US sanctions culminating in the passage of the ILSA represented a 
new step in terms of US sanctions policy.  Having exhausted all available options for unilateral 
sanctions, and having little success motivating allies to join the campaign to isolate Iran the US 
focused its coercive powers on its allies.  The failure to muster an effective diplomatic strategy in 
gaining its cooperation in imposing a multilateral sanctions regime the U.S. Congress decided to 
impose its determination to isolate Iran.  However, two main factors limit the effectiveness of the 
ILSA sanctions.  First, the yielding of the exemptions process to the executive branch placed 
enforcement of these sanctions entirely in the hands of the president.  Second, the ILSA was only 
capable of sanctioning firms who did business with the US and Iran.  While the ILSA regime has 
had little official successes, its effects have had an impact as investment by Western and 
Japanese firms in the Iranian energy sector has declined over the 15 years since its inception.  
Still, the main goal of imposing significant costs on the Iranian economy has remained elusive.  
With oil prices rising in the late 1990's and despite periods of domestic turmoil Iran has 
maintained moderate economic growth.  This has allowed the Iranian regime to continue its 
nuclear program and support for various political organizations throughout the Middle East.  The 
failure of the ILSA sanctions regime to change these behaviors of the Iranian government would 
lead to the institution of a third wave of sanctions. 
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The Third Wave: 2006-2012 
 
 The following decade would see significant changes in the scope of sanctions against Iran 
as well as the number of countries that would begin yielding to US wishes to further isolate the 
IRI.  The Bush Admin continued the Clinton policy of granting specific exemptions for 
businesses under the ILSA, while extended the sanctions a further five years in the spring of 
2001.  The mild tone of the Presidents campaign with regards to foreign policy was overturned 
by the terrorist attacks of Sept 11, 2001.  This single event set about a reordering of the priorities 
of US security policy into a broad strategy known as the Global War of Terror (GWOT).  After 
organizing and executing of the response against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan the US 
began to look at the Middle East in the next stage of its strategy.  In the State of the Union 
address in early 2002 Pres Bush laid out the three states who represented the greatest danger for 
the global order; dubbing them the “Axis of Evil” Iraq, Iran and North Korea were placed in the 
forefront of the GWOT.   
 In the initial stages of the post-September 11 strategy the US sanctions regime against 
Iran was sidelined as the immediate goals of the US shifted to the invasion of Iraq.  All 
diplomatic assistance for US policy was channeled into gaining support and approval for the 
invasion.  US policy seemed to insist that the focus on Iraq would “send a message” to the 
Iranian leadership which would curtail its provocative behavior on the international system after 
being essentially surrounded by 250,000 US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The response in 
Iran was a rejection of the US demands and the political rise of the combative mayor of Tehran 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  Further, despite the allies of Iran in the Israel/Palestine confrontation 
 58 
 
being named “terrorist organizations” by the US, Iranian support for these groups expanded.  The 
US, by 2004, was clearly losing control in Iraq and any hopes of a quick turnaround for the 
military resources to be refocused on Iran were fading considerably (Takeyh and Maloney 2011, 
1304).  The US began to marshall support for a new round of sanctions by putting pressure on 
the UN and IAEA to step up pressure on the Iranian nuclear program. 
 The link between Iranian support for Hamas and Hezbollah and its burgeoning nuclear 
research facilities became an obsession for the US and Israeli security apparatus.  The Bush 
Administration‟s insistence that the international monitoring bodies of the UN and IAEA had 
failed to detect the Weapons of Mass Destruction was the pretext for invading Iraq.  This was 
echoed in the diplomatic effort to ensure the oversight by the IAEA would not go under-
scrutinized in the case of Iran.  European support for these measures had been gaining since the 
compromise with the US after the passage of the ILSA.  European firms began to slowly shift 
away from future prospects for investment in Iran due to the commitment of the US legislature to 
economically isolate Iran and publicly shame firms that explored energy deals with Iran.  By 
2005, European leaders were less tied to the Iranian economy and facing pressure from the US 
over the continued resistance of Iran in adopting more transparent oversight regarding its nuclear 
program (Katzman 2011).  The result was a Europe that was better positioned in 2005 than in 
1996 to respond to the US calls for further sanctions was now in place; all that was needed was a 
trigger.  
 The continued campaign to realize both a fully functioning Bushehr facility a domestic 
capacity to complete the nuclear fuel cycle set the stage for the third wave of sanctions.  Insisting 
that Iran open its facilities to international inspectors as required by the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
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Treaty (NPT) the US charged that delays in inspections and an unwillingness to fully cooperate 
pointed to the program‟s hiding a clandestine weaponization program.  The acquisition of 
equipment necessary for enriching uranium by Iran became common knowledge.  Iran‟s leaders 
had professed a desire to reach the state of a fully self sufficient nuclear fuel cycle.  Such 
technology, however, had been obtained from sources outside the reach of the US sanctions 
regime and full disclosure of the scale of the operation was kept from the IAEA investigators.  
The result was the IAEA Board of Directors issuing a report that concluded that Iran had not 
complied with its obligations under the safeguard agreements to prevent weaponization 
(Kemenade 2010, 100-1).  While lacking any direct evidence of a weaponized nuclear program 
the resistance of Iran to allow full access to IAEA investigators meant that the possibility could 
not be ruled out.   
 The US response was twofold.  First, the push for targeted sanctions against Iran had 
been gaining steam through Under Secretary Stuart Levy.  These new rounds of sanctions used 
the authority granted by the EAA, ILSA and Patriot Act to impose sanction on state based 
institutions, private institutions and individuals within the Iranian regime.  The sanctions were 
first based under the auspices of designating persons and institutions under the authority of the 
1980‟s “terrorism list.”  Combined with EO 13229 (Sept. 2001) the Bush administration sought 
to freeze the assets of any person or organization that had been determined was aiding the Iranian 
regime‟s support of Hezbollah and Hamas among others (Gurule 2009, 29).  As the nuclear 
enrichment program became the primary focus, President Bush signed EO 13382 (June 2005) 
which would attempt to block the assets of groups or individuals that aided Iranian proliferation 
(Eckert 2008, 104).  This included the continuing efforts focused on the nuclear program, but 
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was mainly focused on recent deals with various arms manufacturers in Russia and China in the 
development of the Iranian missile program.  These unilateral measures encompassed the first 
step in the administration‟s policy to enact a targeted sanctions regime.  The next step was to 
enlist the UN in furthering its scope. 
 The second response of the Bush Administration was to push for UN sanctions on the 
individual entities engaged in the nuclear program and gaining support for a wholesale stop to 
supplying Iran with high tech components to further its nuclear and missile program.  The US 
succeeded in passing three UNSC resolutions (1737, 1747, 1803) that mirrored the unilateral 
measures on the US.  This period of 2006-2008 that saw these resolutions pass were aimed at the 
ongoing negations of the P5+1 (UNSC permanent members and Germany) over the uranium 
enrichment program in Iran (Takeyh and Maloney 2011, 1304; Jacobson 2008, 75).  The main 
issue on this multilateral front was the Russian contracts with Iran to finish its long delayed 
Bushehr facility.   
 The main US problem with Russian support for the facility came in form of supplying 
Iran with fuel for its reactor.  The Russian contractors in Bushehr had not established a smooth 
and well functioning relationship with their Iranian hosts.  The project encountered many delays, 
such as conflicts over Iran‟s insistence for the training of Iranian personal rather than relying on 
Russian operators, or Iranian frustrations over the Russian firm‟s decision to scrap the previous 
German components further delaying construction, or delays in Iranian payments to Russian 
firms for services rendered.  The result was the clear desire of the IRI to absorb as much 
technical ability as possible from the Russian experts whose initial agreement made them operate 
most of the critical systems in the facility (Katz 2008, 205).  Frustration with the Iranians 
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eventually led to Russian support for the UNSC resolution 1929 which condemns Iranian 
noncooperation over the nuclear program, further limits the sale of military hardware to Iran, 
mandates the denial of Iran to procure uranium and placed several large IRGC firms on the 
sanctions list.  Russian support for the sanctions on the Iranian nuclear program came only after 
securing an agreement from the IAEA that the facility could be completed.  The arraignment of 
that deal does state that the Russian companies will operate, provide fuel and dispose of spent 
fuel for three years after the plant goes operational.  By gaining support for the UN sanctions on 
Iran the US moved to enact its second wave of unilateral measures against the IRI. 
 This third wave of sanctions departed drastically from the previous attempts by the US to 
construct its sanctions regime.  Rather than focusing on the secondary sanctions on the firms that 
trade and invest in Iran, the focus would move towards the targeting of specific targets within 
Iran‟s government.  This extended to sanctions on specific institutions such as SOE‟s and 
bonyads (state-run charitable organizations with vast holding in the Iranian Economy) while also 
on specific individuals within the regime.  This was considered sound by US officials due to the 
highly centralized nature of the Iranian economy.  Certain state actors with ties to the nuclear or 
missile programs were identified and the US began freezing these entities assets around the 
world.  Further, the provisions within the Patriot Act allowed the US to indict Iranian support for 
Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups and declare their associated financial institutions as 
supporters of terrorism.  Thus, the US banned all transactions with the largest banking entities 
within Iran.  The major difference in these anti-terrorism measures was that they were met with 
much less consternation from European leaders than the ILSA provisions a decade earlier.  By 
this time the political and economic climate in Europe had shifted away from Iran‟s privileged 
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position as a significant trading partner.  The convergence of US and European security policies 
spearheaded by the Bush administration laid the cooperative infrastructure to monitor and 
enforce the highly targeted nature of the sanctions.  The new security regime and the sanctions 
built around it would form the basis for the Obama Administrations continued efforts to expand 
the sanctions regime (Eckert 2008). 
 President Obama‟s strategy was to first send signals to Iran‟s leaders that the door was 
open for negotiations; with the blatant election rigging during the election in mid 2009 and the 
subsequent protests the IRI failed to take any meaningful action.  The result, especially in light of 
a brutal repression of the protestors, the Obama Admin set about to marshall support for the 
second round of its third wave of sanctions.  The strategy followed the previous pattern of the 
Bush Admin: push for multilateral sanctions based on suspicions over the Iranian nuclear 
program while shoring up economic pressure through targeted unilateral sanctions (Takeyh and 
Maloney 2011, 1298; Maloney 2010, 133).  The result was the passage of the Comprehensive 
Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act (CISADA) in July of 2010.  This prohibited the import of 
previous exemptions of imported caviar carpets and pistachios.  Also included were new 
measures that restricted the sale of refined crude products and investments, and further 
restrictions on financial transactions and shipping insurance. President Obama scored a further 
coup by bringing the EU‟s direct enactment of their own sanctions in line with the unilateral 
measures of the US.  The culmination of this third wave represents the continued effort of the US 
to economically isolate Iran from the benefits of the modern global economy.  These efforts have 
not yielded any major political concessions from the Iranian leadership.  Still, with the 
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momentum of the recent successes in bringing Fuller multilateral support the sanction regime has 
never been so expansive in its scope. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMMENTARY ON IRAN SANCTIONS 
 
 The US campaign against Iran has been traced over three main waves of sanctions.  The 
record of these sanctions effectiveness in achieving stated political goals has been a failure for 
several reasons.  First, the US‟s sanction regime against Iran has often been haphazard in its 
construction.  Only from the onset of hostilities during the hostage crisis has the use of sanctions 
by the US served definitive goals and has been implemented efficiently.  While this event was 
primarily a piece of political theatre, the sanctions policies did have a grounding in good 
sanctions theory: the policies involved were directed in a forceful momentum; they were tied to 
achievable goals, they carried the possibility of being lifted, and at the time did impose 
significant costs on the IRI (Hufbauer et. al. 2008).  While the US was successful in enacting 
sanctions unilaterally it was incapable of gaining significant multilateral support for constructing 
a wider sanctions regime.  These factors were partly responsible for the resolution of the crisis, 
but were by no means the main factor for the “success” in resolving the crisis (Miyagawa 1992, 
ch. 9).  After the lifting of sanctions following the hostage crisis the relationship between the US 
and Iran did not improve.    
 As analyzed above the following years saw the tensions between the US and Iran 
escalate, and subsequently the exploitation of those tensions payed political dividends to the 
domestic leaders in both nations.  The choices of both states in the subsequent events seemed to 
validate the portrayal of the other side as committed enemies.  For the IRI, US support of 
Saddam Hussein in his invasion of Iran; for the US, the Marine barracks bombing and Lebanese 
hostage taking.  Both events solidified the status of the other as requiring it to make the first 
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gesture of reconciliation.  Due to the domestic political constraints such an act of courage would 
not be forthcoming.  The intransigence of both the US and the IRI created a policy stalemate 
whereby neither side has the incentives to make declarations of goodwill (Askari 2003, 194; 
O‟Sullivan 2003, 91).  The lack of direct communication compounded with strategies relying 
upon proxy actors only exacerbated the the strategic disconnect between both states.   
 The results for US sanctions policy has been the lack of a clear motivating guide for 
enacting sanctions again Iran.  After the Marine barracks bombing the US cited the IRI‟s support 
for terrorist groups as the primary factor for sanctions.  In the early 1990‟s, Iranian diplomacy 
against the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process was the cause cited.  By the mid 1990‟s unrealistic 
fears of a fast approaching nuclear armed Iran as an impending threat towards Israel provided the 
impetus for the ILSA.  All three of these factors have now seemingly merged into a simple 
rejection of all Iranian foreign policy.  The narrative of a nuclear armed, anti-Israeli, terrorist 
supporting Iran is too grand a negotiating position for the US to continue demanding the 
necessary changes for lifting sanctions.  To do so would require a complete reversal of the 
Iranian diplomatic strategy for the last thirty years (Takeyh and Maloney 2011, 1302-3).   
 The role of US sanctions policy in constructing this irreconcilable position is partly to 
blame.  The US, by its democratic nature, has had its sanctions policy heavily influenced by 
groups dead-set on curtailing Iran‟s policies.  These initiatives have often been ill-timed and not 
informed through diplomatic contact through official channels.  Rather, the litany of political 
forces led to four chaotic years of negotiating the fairly impotent ILSA provisions.  The 
difficulty for the Clinton Administration was that the legislated provisions of the ILSA had 
removed much of the unilateral incentives that they could offer in case of reconciliation with the 
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Iranian leadership.  The result being that the US was not in a position to credibly offer the more 
liberal minded President Khatami any possibility for lifting the sanctions. 
 The most recent wave of sanctions have improved on the inconsistency in US policy, but 
also highlights a major reason for the failure of US policy.  The changing international security 
regimes in the post 9-11 climate also streamlined the ability to coordinate such policies among 
the US and the EU.  This could primarily be attributed to the lack of involvement by the US 
Congress in this process.  Still, while both the Bush and Obama Administration did successfully 
organize a multilateral sanctions regime through the UNSC and further the unilateral restrictions 
on the IRI‟s financial transactions, the ability of these sanctions to impose the costs necessary to 
bring Iran into line with US desires remains unresolved.   
 The second failure of the US sanctions regime is the inability to impose costs severe 
enough to convince the IRI‟s leadership to change its behavior.  The first wave of sanctions 
initiated during the hostage crisis did reduce by a significant amount the economic discourse 
between the two nations.  The US cancelled aid and outstanding military contracts, as well as 
pressured allies to cease development projects within Iran as a result of the hostilities.  These 
actions by the US resulted in severe losses to the Iranian economy by disrupting the flow of 
goods, freezing assets in US banks and delaying contracted projects such as the Bushehr facility.  
The costs of the sanctions were compounded on the tumultuous events of the Islamic Revolution 
which were followed by the invasion by Iraq.  The cumulative effect of these events ultimately 
led to the release of the hostages, but the role of the sanctions as the primary reason in achieving 
this goal is suspect.  Indeed, bans by the IRI on doing business with the US, now labeled the 
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“great Satan,” reflected the determination of the IRI‟s leadership to establish its anti-
Americanism as part of its international strategy.   
 The sanctions that resulted in the wake of the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon only 
furthered the trends of denying the IRI access to US military goods.  This formed a larger 
strategy of the US during the Iran-Iraq War of ensuring a strategic balance between the enemies.  
The bombing provided a useful pretext to formalize this policy in the scope of the US 
commitment to counterterrorism surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian issue.  These sanctions 
provided the Reagan Admin with a policy so that it could be seen as responding to a blatant 
attack on its soldiers in the region.  The use of sanctions that came with adding the IRI to the list 
of states that support terrorism was a symbolic use of power that formalized the policy within the 
context of the US policy towards the greater Middle East.  By denying Iran access to technology 
that could be used in increasing its military capacity the US sought to ensure a continued 
stalemate between Iran and Iraq.  Sanctions initiated in the late 1980 have sought to deny the 
Iranians any technology that could be used in weapons of mass destruction.  Still, these 
sanctions, while in combination with a diplomatic strategy to prevent sales from secondary 
sources, remained wholly inadequate in bringing about a change in Iranian support for terrorist 
groups abroad.   
 The actual economic effect of these sanctions was limited mainly to costs associated with 
the rise in premiums from purchasing military technology from secondary sources that Iran 
needed to fight the war with Iraq.  The actual costs to the economy are comparatively minimal 
when compared to the damage to property and the loss of life sustained during the war 
(O‟Sullivan 2003, 63).  The lack of costs to the IRI‟s economy associated with the US sanctions 
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regime was actually sought after by the US‟s desire to see the war end in a stalemate.  Imposing 
harsh economic and financial sanctions would have hindered the Iranians ability to fend off the 
Iraqi invasion.  Thus, US firms throughout the war were able to purchase Iranian crude and 
business continued to import and export in the non-oil sectors of the economy as well.  It was 
only after the war when Iran began reconstruction and the US removed the balancing threat of 
Iraq after the First Gulf War that the issue of imposing costs on a growing Iranian economy 
became strategically necessary. 
 The second wave of sanctions embodied in the passage of the ILSA sought to punish the 
IRI by sanctioning secondary firms that invested in the Iranian energy sector.  The US‟s desire to 
impose costs on an Iranian economy now developing after the war with Iraq had severe unilateral 
limitations.  Up to this time, a state imposed sanctions on another by disrupting the flow of goods 
between them.  Thus, in order for sanctions to have the desired effect the sender of the sanction 
must have a stake in the target‟s economy and be willing to endure the costs on its own domestic 
economy associated with the loss in trade with the target.  By the mid 1990‟s the US trade with 
Iran was down to 10% of its value during the Shah‟s regime, and had very little to threaten Iran 
through unilaterally denying access to the US economy.  Lawmakers in the US Congress came to 
believe that the answer to this problem was to sanction firms that do business with Iran by 
denying them access to the US economy.  These “secondary boycotts” had never been executed 
in such a sweeping fashion before this time and faced significant challenges. 
 First, the ability to sanction private firms in allied states based on political motivations 
had dubious legal standing in international law.  The US who had supported the rise of free trade 
institutions was essentially proposing selected tariffs on firms that did business with Iran 
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(Takeyh and Maloney 2011).  The national interest of US allies also faced the possibility of the 
losses of economic wealth associated with these secondary sanctions.  In effect, the US sought to 
punish Iran by deflecting the domestic costs of the sanctions onto other states.  US allies lobbied 
the Clinton Admin with what they felt was unjust punitive measures on those who lacked the 
political will to sanction Iran.  The US, by taking the fight to its allies, sought to convey the 
seriousness with which it took the strategy of imposing economic isolation on Iran.  The costs 
associated with the ILSA sanctions have had a moderate impact on the Iranian economy.  The 
lack of an efficient imposition meant that Iran had time to see the US strategy as it was 
developing and adjust as the conflict between the US and its allies played out in the aftermath.  
The general conclusion is that the ILSA sanctions did impose the significant short term 
“nuisance” costs on Iran‟s though its need to reform a new development strategy, while the 
medium to long term costs of these sanctions has been minimal.  This is primarily due to the rise 
in price of oil since the ILSA sanctions and also in the ability of other states, primarily Russia 
and China, to fill the gap left by fleeing US allies (Askari et. al. 2003, O‟Sullivan 2003).  These 
trends would continue throughout the lead up to the third round of sanctions. 
 While the US has sought to impose sanctions on Iran by limiting the availability of its 
allies in participating in the Iranian economy, the source for development of Iranian energy 
assets has not lacked in potential prospects.  The combination of the ILSA and the diplomatic 
efforts of the US after Sept 11 have brought a stagnation of Western companies in investing in 
Iran‟s energy sector.  This shortfall has been filled by the aggressive energy investment strategies 
of Chinese and Indian companies to supply their rapid growth.  Thus, the longer term costs of US 
sanctions intended to deny Iran access to international capital failed to gain sufficient global 
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cooperation.  The result has been an inefficient application of sanctions that has failed in its 
comprehensiveness to impose long term costs on the IRI.  The final and most recent wave of 
sanctions would suffer from similar problems but is still too ambiguous in its effects. 
 The final round of sanctions enacted by the Bush and Obama Admins has sought to 
correct the failures of the previous sanctions regimes.  To do so, the US marshaled its diplomatic 
resources around the shifts in anti-terrorism policies of its allies to directly target specific entities 
within Iran.  Using the fear of a potential nuclear terrorist attack the US began sanctioning the 
financial centers involved in transactions with the groups associated with the nuclear program, 
namely the IRGC and Quds Forces.  These groups presented a vast target within Iran for the 
US‟s new efforts at constructing a new sanctions regime.  The rise to power of the IRGC and the 
vast and nebulous nature of their economic networks presented prime and specially defined 
targets for US sanctions.  These sanctions have shifted the focus of imposing costs on Iran 
economy in general, to specifically targeting elements deemed threats to the US and its allies.  
To be sure, the US allowed exceptions to its previous sanctions policies on the grounds of 
humanitarian necessity for the general Iranian public, but the third round of sanctions sought to 
bypass this process by specifically focusing on predetermined targets.  While the US enjoyed 
successes in gaining support in the UN and convincing the EU and Japan to join the US in 
enacting its sanctions regime, the overall effects in terms of costs remains ambiguous. 
 The intension of denying Iran a free hand in attracting investment and disrupting its 
ability to move international capital has imposed costs on Iran‟s leadership but the scale of these 
costs have not brought significant behavioral changes.  This is due to the fact that US sanctions 
policy has suffered from its slow evolution.  Through thirty years of sanctions policy the US first 
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detached itself from the Iranian economy only to formalize the detachment some fifteen years 
later in the form of ILSA.  This pattern of slowly changing the strategic international 
environment only to enact sanctions that merely mirror the reality faced by Iran remains at the 
heart of the US‟s inability to impose significant shocks efficiently.  In the case of the third round 
of sanctions Iran followed its pattern for the implementation of the ILSA sanctions.  Iran, already 
adjusted to the isolating effects of the ILSA sanctions by courting Russian and Chinese firms, 
had moved its economic interest away from only a small and select group of Western firms that 
already gained exemptions from US sanctions under the provisions in the ILSA.  The move to 
deny Iran access to US financial markets was essentially a nonstarter in that Iran had already 
began to divest from the US financial infrastructure as its response to ILSA.  Thus, the US found 
itself in a similar situation: the sanctions already mirrored Iran‟s adjustments to sanctions, and 
though they succeeded in imposing short term costs (mainly in the form of “nuisance costs”) the 
lack of international comprehensiveness means that the potential for long term costs remains 
negligible.  There are even arguments that Iran‟s relatively positive growth during the recent 
global financial crisis is because of the unintended benefits of the US‟s strategy to isolate the IRI 
from the international financial marketplace.  Thus, the sanctions against Iran have failed to 
result in concrete policy changes that are favorable to the US.  This is primarily a result of the 
poor construction of the sanctions regime by the US and the efforts of Iran in reacting to US 
policies. 
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US Sanction Regime in the Context of ESR 
 
 To further examine the US sanction regime against Iran the ESR recommendations will 
provide an analytic framework.  The first recommendation is that the goals of the sanction 
regime be limited in the scope and avoided tackling audacious outcomes.  The goals of the US 
sanction regime served to maintain issues: Iranian support of Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups 
and the nuclear program.  The rise of the Islamic Republic came with a drastic reinvention of 
Iranian foreign-policy.  Once an erstwhile US ally, the new regime defined itself in opposition to 
US policies.  The new politicized Shia theocracy sought to spread its pan Islamic vision through 
the Muslim world.  In mirroring its own overthrow from an oppressive dictator the use of 
violence to achieve these goals was considered necessary.  The renouncing of “terrorist” Iranian 
support from groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas are not a clear-cut political maneuver for 
Iranian leaders. 
 The entrenching of Iran's support for these groups is based around the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict.  This issue has come to define the regional policy of Iran and is tied to wider US 
demands for the end of sanctions.  The key question, is whether Iran would choose to abandon its 
support in the absence of a resolution to the Palestinian issue?  If an agreement between the US 
and Iran is to combat any point in the reasonable future the assumption is that an agreement must 
be reached under the current status quo.  This would require some amount of concession from 
both the US and Iran over the support for terrorist groups. 
 The initial problem is that the groups in question are autonomous not directed by both 
parties involved.  Iranian concerns over Israeli policies cannot serve as the linchpin for 
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negotiations on this issue in the same way that Iranian subsidies for Hamas and Hezbollah 
service the stated cause of US objections.  The association of responsibility over the actions of 
independent third party allies is doomed to stalemate as the influence is inherently limited.  Both 
sides can argue that it is the very support of the opponent that enables the violent conflict to 
continue, but the resolution of this position requires that both Iran and the US removed or limit 
the eggs of their respective clients.  Given the large amount of political collateral invested by 
both states in this issue this seems unlikely.  The nature of the Israeli–Palestinian quagmire and 
the positions of both Iran and the US and it, reflect the complicated and highly contentious issue 
that Iranian “support for terrorists” organizations represent.  Any sanction whose removal is 
dependent on a major resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian issue as a prerequisite can hardly be 
termed limited or modest. 
 The nuclear issue, however, does appear to provide a more favorable scenario for 
success.  Within this issue rests with the Iranian leaders refusal to adhere to NPT protocols and 
the distrust over Iranian secrecy regarding its enrichment program.  The accusation of US leaders 
is that the secrecy implies that Iran is violating the NPT by using the legal acquisition of nuclear 
technology and development for weaponization.  This suspicion is further deepened by the 
continuation of the Iranian missile program; a presumed delivery system for nuclear weapons. 
 The inherent distrust between the US and Iran also plays a dominating role in this issue.  
The potential for military confrontation from the US or Israel is never far removed from the 
conflict over Iranian proliferation.  This fuels a cyclical security game were threats require the 
response of more threats, and the potential for military conflict between highly despairing 
military capability requires a deterrent for the weaker party.  This cycle can be broken, but would 
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require ground given by both sides.  Historical examples for de-proliferation do offer some 
precedent that Iran can maintain its nuclear program, and have the infrastructure for the complete 
fuel cycle, while meeting its requirements under the NPT.  For this to happen, the removal of the 
US as a security threat would be the first requirement.  Even then, there remain no guarantees 
that Iranian leaders would give up all research on weaponization.  Still, while this issue does 
appear to be the most resolvable of the two it could hardly be modest in its scope. 
 Another prime condition from ESR states that when the target and sender have positive 
diplomatic relations the likelihood of concessions is raised.  From the extensive discussion this 
point requires little explanation here, but does allow for another requirement to be discussed.  
Sanctions that are accompanied by covert or military actions are also less likely to succeed.  The 
logic of these points is that a target when confronted by a hostile sender has less incentive to be 
seen yielding to an adversary.  When the sender accompanies sanctions with military backing the 
stakes of conflict are raised and the ability to conduct open negotiations is hindered.  Apart from 
the failed attempt to rescue the hostages there have been no direct actions taken by the US.  Still, 
US backing Iraq during the 1980‟s, the presence of US military throughout the 1990‟s and the 
occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan in the to thousands have not remove the specter of potential 
military action and has not abated Iranian security concerns. 
 When it is time for sanctions to be imposed ESR recommends that two main factors 
represent the optimal manner for their execution.  First, sanctions should be implemented 
forcefully and in as short a period as needed.  Second, sanctions should require as few other 
countries as possible to affect the desired costs.  This point is one of effectiveness and efficiency, 
hit the target fast and hit the target hard.  The time associated with securing a successful counter 
 75 
 
strategy to avoid the costs of sanctions can be a weakness for a target facing a well organized and 
highly effective sanction regime.  Often the larger the number of allies the less likely a policy 
can be implemented.  Coordinating all the interests and concerns into a policy that must be 
initiated at the behest of multiple sovereign partners does not lend itself to a favorable 
comparison to a smaller cabal of like-minded senders.  The implications of these two 
requirements also look into the previous recommendation that the goal of the sender must be 
modest.  A more modest goal would imply a less complex structure and policy to see it ends 
through.  The modesty not only refers to the goals but also the means of achieving these goals.  
Regardless of the goals, poorly implemented policy is never desirable.  All sanctions should 
strive to have impact in their implementation and enforcement.  This should have a net gain for 
the sender in terms of the costs associated within the regime.   
 ESR places primacy on the issue of costs for both the sender and the target.  Costs to the 
target should be maximized while the sender should limit its own exposure to its domestic costs.  
One of the best means for achieving this is by following the previous advice about effective 
implementation.  Sanctions constructed to maximize costs to the target can see a good plan go to 
waste if not effectively implemented.  If the costs to the target are delayed and spread out this 
allows the target to construct and execute a counter strategy.  Once the target can lessen its cost 
of maintaining a stalemate the less coercive effect the sanction regime possesses.  The 
Association of an efficient policy and the ability to impose forceful and significant costs to the 
target has represented a major failure of US policy towards Iran. 
 While the US has made the use of sanctions a cornerstone of its policy towards Iran, the 
quality of that policy is dubious.  Overall, the sanction regime has been piecemeal at best and not 
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succeeded in recruiting enough allies to have a forceful impact on the run.  As reviewed above, 
the messy implementation of the ILSA regime was telegraphed to Iran through the legislative 
debate within the US and failed to gain any impact through cooperation with US allies.  While 
the long-term effects of reduced the involvement of US allies in the Iranian energy sector the 
prolonged negotiations gave Iran plenty of time to respond and mitigate the intended costs. 
 The first wave consisted of, at the onset of the hostage crisis, the best record for the force 
and efficiency requirements, but failed in that it required too many allies to bring sufficient costs 
to bear.  This inability to inflict sufficient costs resulted in the 15 month-long hostage crisis.  The 
following sections were primarily directed at the military and nuclear acquisitions of the Iranian 
regime.  The limited number of states that have access to the high-tech products and services are 
few; implying a high probability for success.  As of this writing, Iran has yet to acquire nuclear 
weapons capability.  This part of the US sanction regime has succeeded in significantly delaying 
this acquisition, but it's course of ability has failed to resolve the issue. 
 The third wave has benefited from the post-September 11 security regime for these 
points.  The increasing cooperation between the US and Europe has made the implementation of 
the financial sanctions much more efficient.  The globalized nature of banking and the ability to 
process information and enforce sanctions has led to these targeted sanctions in becoming the 
backbone of US policy.  The utility of these sanctions in terms of cost to the target is reduced 
over time.  This is due to several factors: first, the rise to power of nations outside of Europe 
means that more countries are required to forcefully impose costs on the target and second, 
realizing this, Iranian leaders can begin to shift its requirements away from participating 
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members to the rising states outside the sanction regime.  Each successive round has a 
diminishing return to the sender in the cost it imposes on the target. 
 The final ESR recommendations concerned the domestic situation of the target.  
Economic sanctions have the best possibility of success if the target is already in a state of 
economic decline or upheaval.  Since most sanctions involve a sender country with a much larger 
economy the shocks associated with sanctions often fall on targets with less than optimal 
conditions.  ESR found that this condition does not imply the relative size is that important of a 
factor when other considerations are considered: goals, warmth of relations prior to sanctions, 
and the timely imposition of sanctions.  The final domestic consideration for the target is the type 
of regime faced. 
 Authoritarian regimes, as analyzed previously, present significant problems to the sender.  
They stereotype among Western democracies concerning autocratic regimes as always near the 
verge of succumbing to a population eager to embrace Western political ideals has provided 
justification for many miscalculations and Western foreign-policy.  In keeping in line with the 
condition of modest goals the survival of a despot's regime is its primary concern.  Sanctions 
intended to bring about a change in the target's leadership does not meet the modest criteria when 
considering its importance to the target.  The sender's attempts to manipulate autocratic regimes 
face an opponent without the constraints of democratic institutions and political pressures.  The 
malleability of costs and the ability to transfer hardship without the political constraints of the 
rule of law and a politically mobilized citizenry make autocratic regimes difficult targets and 
significantly reduce the success of sanctions.  In the case of Iran the democratic structure plays 
an important explanatory role in the performance of the US sanction regime. 
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 The US has sought to coerce Iran by focusing on the energy sector, military procurement 
and nuclear technology.  This is meant the primary intended effects of the sanctions are on the 
government with unavoidable secondary costs on the population of Iran.  The structure of the 
Iranian economy is highly centralized in the sectors targeted by US sanctions.  Military and 
nuclear embargoes are obviously aimed at the military institutions of the regime.  The targeting 
of the energy sector is intended to deny the main source of funding to the regime.  The changing 
dynamics within the Iranian economy clearly highlight the challenges associated with 
sanctioning the Iranian regime.  There are three unique factors in this regard. 
 The first factor is the dominant position of the bonyad, a charitable conglomerate, which 
was created by the regime after the revolution as a means for managing the large state-run 
economy of the Shah through the theocratic structure of the new government.  These bone jobs 
or large corporate like entities that make up roughly 30 to 40% of the economy.  Bonyads are, in 
principle, separate from other SOE's, but are highly political entities.  Though their initial duty is 
to provide aid to the impoverished in Iran, over the course of the years since the revolution they 
have become powerful economic institutions.  The charitable conception of the bonyad provides 
unique economic opportunities that make targeting these institutions difficult for sanction 
regime.  First, bonyads are not subject to the laws of normal economic discourse; second, 
bonyads are exempt from oversight by the Iranian Parliament and executive administrations and 
are answerable only to the supreme leader.  The lack of transparency, allows the Iranian regime 
the ability to deflect the costs of sanctions from the public.  The lack of transparency also makes 
targeting entities owned by bonyads difficult is the ownership and function of these companies 
are not part of the public record.  Bonyads also present the ability to create and remove 
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companies unhindered by governmental economic regulations.  The bonyad system provides a 
valuable resource for avoiding the efforts of targeted sanctions by providing a smokescreen 
outside of the observable economy. 
 The second institution is the IRGC, a branch of the Iranian military that was initially 
charged with ensuring the survival of the Islamic theocracy and enforcing its laws.  Today, the 
IRGC has over 100,000 active members and is one of the largest economic organizations in the 
country.   The reasons for its rise as an economic power are similar to those of the bonyad.  
Initially, the IRGC was established after the revolution as a check on the Shah's army.  This 
sensitive domestic role was directed under the auspices of the Ayatollah Khomeini.  The IRGC 
was granted extralegal status similar to that of the bonyads and was not subject to governmental 
oversight.  The reforms instituted after the Iran-Iraq war allow the IRGC to acquire business 
holdings as a means of meeting its budget.  Over the last 15 years the economic strategy has 
provided political power as many prominent positions in the Iranian regime are now held by 
former and current IRGC members.  The status of the IRGC is an economic and military 
institution combined with the extralegal position within the society raises significant challenges 
for sanctions policy.  The US leaders can target the leadership of this group in its intentions to 
enact punitive economic efforts it is still faced with the inability to determine whom that 
leadership delineates its objectives.  Operating outside of an already obtuse, centralized 
economic system has aided the regime in building its nuclear and missile programs which are 
under the direction of the IRGC. 
 The third major factor in the difficulties in sanctioning Iran is the presence of vast energy 
resources.  In the two other comparisons of US comprehensive sanction regimes, Cuba and North 
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Korea, the influence of oil wealth is obvious.  Both Cuba and North Korea, while having 
maintained a determined policy of opposition in the face of sanctions, have also been severely 
encumbered in their economic development.  Iran, although not a bastion of development, does 
enjoy an enviable position of having a GDP nearly 10 times that of Cuba and 20 times that of 
North Korea.  Indeed, oil revenue alone in Iran surpasses the combined GDP of these countries.  
The value of having a highly fungible and valuable commodity in subverting the effects of 
sanctions is paramount in helping explain why Iran is such a difficult target to sanction. 
 In the context of the ESR conditions for successful sanctions, oil wealth presents 
considerable obstacles.  If denying the Iranian regime the benefits of its oil trade is a paramount 
objective of US sanctions, then it would require the participation of a majority of the developed 
economies.  Hence, it fails the recommendation of requiring a limited number cooperating 
countries to implement the regime.  The importance of oil for the modern economy cannot be 
easily offset without significant cost to the sender‟s of those sanctions.  The incentives created by 
an insufficiently constructed oil embargo for third party states not participating in the sanction 
regime enjoy a privileged negotiating position with the target; as sanctions tend to reduce the 
price of a target‟s exports.  Given the vastness of Iran‟s oil supply and its high value, both parties 
still gain in the transaction.  All of this is evident in the difficulty in gaining multilateral support 
for US sanctions as Iran has had limited trouble in finding alternate buyers and investors.  EU 
members‟ investment and purchases in Iranian oil have fallen since the ILSA only to be replaced 
by the rise of the Chinese and Indian economies.  The vast trade in oil also provides Iran with a 
considerable amount of foreign exchange which can be used to facilitate its participation on the 
international markets for clandestine procurements of sanctioned goods.   
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 All of these factors present the US sanction regime against Iran in a unique position of 
facing the possibility that sanctions may not succeed in isolating the regime, but hinder its 
potential for development.  With the strategic importance of Iranian oil supplies, the extreme 
demand for those resources and the ability of the burgeoning super powers to strike better deals 
with an Iran under sanctions than with other suppliers the current ineffective stalemate will likely 
continue.  Iran, it seems, is able to succeed in avoiding the full effect of US sanctions just enough 
to continue its current foreign and nuclear policy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In the end the failure of the US sanction regime has been the inability to gain the political 
cooperation to effectively isolate the Iran and impose the costs necessary to succeed.  US 
policymakers have understood that an expansive multilateral sanction regime was what was 
necessary to bring the largest amount of costs to bear on the Iranian regime.  The failures of US 
policy are complicated when given the political context for each wave.  The first wave of 
sanctions was intended to resolve the hostage crisis negotiations, but could not garner the support 
of its allies to succeed in a timely fashion.  Reagan‟s strategy was to ensure a stalemate in the 
Iran-Iraq war and to keep Iran from procuring the military means of succeeding to spread its 
interpretation of militant Shia liberation in Lebanon and elsewhere.  Here, the sanctions regime 
was playing a more nuanced and less ambitious coercive agenda.  In the final round of sanctions 
during the first wave that followed the cease-fire of the Iran-Iraq war the US turned to further the 
military embargoes and extend provisions to keep a recovering Iran from acquiring nuclear 
capability. 
 The continuation of the principles laid down towards the end of the first wave and into 
the early years of the Clinton administration were ill-equipped to respond to potential diplomatic 
breakthroughs in the US-Iran relationship.  The potential for such deals did exist, but such a 
diplomatic rapprochement would have required time to develop the adequate amount of trust 
necessary to begin dismantling the US sanctions regime.  The more ardent opponents of Iran in 
the US are unwilling to run the risk of a potential betrayal, or having the good faith extended by 
both parties ruined by some unforeseen factor and resulting in a stronger Ian as a consequence.  
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By the enlistment of the U.S. Congress the Hawks won the policy debate within Washington and 
Clinton was forced to adopt the ILSA provisions that would dominate the US sanction regime for 
the next 10 years. 
 With the passage of the ILSA, the strategy of the US sanction regime was now 
rededicated to the use of economic coercion as a means of altering Iranian behavior.  
Congressional leaders understood the past failures of the US sanctions were their inability to 
build a large enough coalition in imposing costs on Iran.  Now, the US brought its coercive 
measures to bear on its allies.  The logic of this is similar to that of the studies of Early (2010) 
where he observed that states most likely to engage in sanction busting trade are those states 
aligned with the sender.  The US, in seeing the duplicitous nature of European and Japanese 
firms‟ continued economic dealings with Iran, essentially sought to sanction its allies for failing 
to cooperate with US wishes.  Strangely, this also mirrors conditions set forth by ESR where 
friends are more likely to comply to a sender‟s demands then enemies.  Since the deals reached 
by the Clinton administration to exempt European firms that occurred around the passage of the 
ILSA the involvement of Western firms in the Iranian economy has reduced.   
 This is a result of both the ILSA and the cooperation between European and US leaders 
in the post Sept. 11 security structure.  The change in priorities for European leaders following 
the continued antiterrorist lobbying of the Bush administration did result in the desired outcomes 
of the architects of the ILSA regime.  However, the value of the Iranian energy reserve and the 
rise of the Asian economies soon fill the gap left by exiting European and Japanese firms.  
Ironically, the source of this glut in funds during the Chinese economy was funded in part by the 
US trade imbalance and budget deficits throughout the 2000„s.  While Hawks in the US could 
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celebrate a victory in removing a major source of necessary investments in the Iranian energy 
sector the relative keys with which Iran was able to procure its replacement provided the impetus 
for the third wave of sanctions.  The initial break of European duplicity in dealing with Iran by 
the ILSA regime made these further efforts possible by reducing the cost for the Us and its allies 
in eliciting cooperation for the expanding sanctions. 
 The continuation of the US strategy to rely so heavily on economic coercion will require 
a similar break from the Asian powers of China and India.  Both of these nations are now poised 
to be the largest purchasers and investors in Iran‟s energy sector.  The historical pattern of 
Iranian sanction busting surrounding its energy sector is primarily due to the value of its vast 
energy resources.  The motivation of countries willing to renounce US calls for sanctioning Iran 
are based in a larger debate surrounding international relations.  Our sanction busters actively 
attempting to subvert the strategic dominance of US power by soft balancing against the US?  
Or, are sanction busters simply responding to the demands of their own domestic economies and 
the incentives created by the US sanction regime?  Evidence from the quantitative studies 
covered in the study suggests the latter position is predominantly the best explanation.  Reality, 
however, is more complicated than a single theoretical argument.    
 Were the value of the sanctioned good not so high the US efforts at isolating Iran would 
have been more successful.  It should be said that this does not mean that US desires to change 
Iranian foreign-policy would have a guaranteed of success.  In examining the target state‟s 
ability to sanction bust the primary factor is that it must find willing partners to trade with, or be 
willing to endure the difficulties of near total economic autonomy.  Target states with the means 
to coerce its allies or with something of value to offer them have the greatest ability to find 
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sanction busting partners.  Power, as realized here, reflects the target‟s ability to use its economic 
assets and position in the global economy in order to gain allies willing to go against the sender‟s 
sanction regime.  The target, if faced by a moderately competent sanction regime, will incur 
some costs that leadership has already accepted as necessary to continue the policies as it sees in 
its national interest.  Sanction busting is the policy of every target that chooses stalemate instead 
of yielding to the sender.  The more powerful and successful the target, the longer it can resist. 
 For Iran this resistance has centered on several strategies.  The first wave of sanctions 
began with the highly specified context of the hostage crisis.  Occurring after the Islamic 
Revolution the US was faced with a new Iranian leadership that had previously committed itself 
to cutting off its ties to the West.  By the time US sanctions were imposed in November 1979 it 
was as if Iran had already begun a strategy of self imposed economic independence to counter 
the loss of trade.  The lack of multilateral support and an eager USSR provided Iran little 
difficulty in modestly diversifying its economic relations and countering the loss of goods and 
services from US sanctions.  It was only after the invasion by Saddam Hussein and the 
recognition of Iranian leaders that its financial position regarding the US asset freezes and finical 
sanctions necessitated compromise with the US.  In the years during the Iran-Iraq war a 
reengaged US sanction regime sought to limit the availability of military goods to Iran in order to 
ensure a favorable geopolitical outcome.  Following the war, sanctions imposed to deny Iran the 
direct export of its crude to US markets were undercut by the ability of US firms to import the 
refined crude products and required only basic measures to counter. 
 The second wave of US sanctions sought to end the leniency of previous unilateral 
sanctions in the first wave and expand its multilateral efforts to deny Iran a free hand in 
 86 
 
developing its energy sector.  The ILSA regime sought to gain multilateral support by imposing 
secondary sanctions on firms and states that invested in the Iranian energy sector or aided its 
military and nuclear programs.  In this case the Iranian strategy was aided by several preliminary 
factors.  The process of passing the Congressionally mandated sanctions occurred over several 
years, this allowed Iran with plenty of time to observe the content of the sanctions and begin 
planning a policy to adjust.  The upheavals of European and Japanese firms in response to the 
ILSA regime delayed the effects of the secondary sanctions and were further mitigated through 
the exemption process whose negotiated resolution occurred several years after its imposition.  
While the initial ban on US firms from purchasing Iranian crude did impose some short-term 
costs the value of the commodity was easily sold to purchasers outside the ILSA regime.   
 The inability to efficiently roll out the ILSA sanction regime and the combative nature 
towards US allies removed the strategic shock to the Iranian economy.  Iranian leaders began to 
court alternate markets for its highly valuable energy sector and reduced the efficacy of the 
sanctions by maintaining economic relations with most of its European trade partners.  While 
Iran faced an initial shortfall of investment capital in the years following the full imposition of 
the ILSA regime, these costs were eventually replaced as new relationships were established.  
The replacement strategy has exploited inability of the US to coerce participation in the ILSA 
regime.  Firms in Russia, China, India and Indonesia with few or no ties to the US economy 
began to respond to the vacuum left from the slow removal of European, Japanese and South 
Korean investors in Iran‟s energy sector.  The result for the ILSA regime has been primarily in 
costs associated with the delay in development by having to establish new economic ties.    
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 The third wave of sanctions have sought to constrain the ability of Iran from engaging the 
the global economy.  Initially the US expanded its newly created security structure involving the 
finances of terrorist groups to inhibit Hamas and Hezbollah from cooperating with and receiving 
aid from Iran.  In building off this initial structure the US marshaled the necessary political 
capital to enact the first UN sanctions on the Iranian nuclear and missile program.  These 
sanctions have primarily sought to restrict the capability of Iran, rather than impose significant 
costs.  While cooperation among European banks in implementing the anti-terrorist financial 
sanctions has been effective Iran is still capable of maneuvering around this structure by 
implementing alternate financial relationships to fund Hamas and Hezbollah.  Iranian leaders 
have used the high demand for its energy resources as the primary means of establishing an 
alternative market for its sanction industries.  As the US has denied Iran the ability to freely use 
Western dominated financial structures and institutions, Iran has formed direct trade deals with 
Chinese, Indian and other firms through subsidiary conduits in regional financial centers.  Often 
based in outside the Western dominated financial structure, such as the UAE, Kuwait, India, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, these large banking institutions now have the means to handle the 
large transactions associated with securing sovereign transfers of energy resources.  It has been 
the rise of the Asian economies in the last decade and their ability to offer as a viable alternative 
to the Western financial structure that has corresponded with the expansion of the US sanction 
regime in gaining European cooperation.   
 The US has also faced difficulties in bringing sufficient pressure on the leadership of 
Iran.  Directing the impact of sanctions on the target‟s ruling elite is a major factor in bringing 
the requisite pressure for a solution viable to the domestic politics within the state.  Iran presents 
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several difficulties in this regard.  While it is not controversial to classify Iran as not being a 
democracy, there is difficulty in placing Iran directly in the authoritarian category as well.  the 
myriad of factions within Iran compete in a much more dynamic and fluid manner than simply 
being dominated by a single leader or tightly bound oligopoly.  The rise to power of the IRGC 
does demonstrate that the conception of Iran as being dominated by any single actor is simply 
not accurate.  The highly centralized economy that is lacking in Western traditions of 
transparency combined with the inability of US policymakers to determine the structure of the 
political power in Iran make identifying which groups to pressure difficult to target.  High levels 
of political animosity between the US and Iran means that any attempt by the US that appears 
directed at aid a domestic faction in Iran would damage the domestic credibility of any potential 
allies.  With the initiation of the third wave of sanction US leaders turned to a strategy of 
targeting members and institutions of the Iranian domestic structure that they knew they wanted 
to punish rather than selecting targets that potentially threaten the domestic factions the US 
would like to see come to power.  This has primarily served to limit the acquisition of nuclear 
and missile technology while also intending to restrict the power of those targeted as well.   
Further Research 
 
 This study has undertaken and evaluation of the US sanction regime against Iran to 
highlight its weaknesses and gain a preliminary understanding of the means sanction busting 
available.  This has primarily been constructed on the relationship between the two states within 
a sender/target dynamic.  To expand the implications of this analysis several further steps must 
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be taken.  First, is to expand the theoretical implications for third party actors along a state-based 
and firm-based analysis.  Several studies have examined the incentive structures surround the 
various types of sanction regime and will provide a valuable resource in expanding a model of 
sanction busting (Shambaugh 1999; Rodman 2001; Bapat and Morgan 2003).  Expanding on the 
third party dynamic would require an accounting of the immediate regional concerns for the 
target and the sender.  Is the sender geographically close to the target?  Is the target a dominating 
presence in the regional power structure?  What is the size of the target‟s economy in relation to 
its regional neighbors?  Questions such as these have often been overlooked in the quantitative 
study of sanctions as bargaining games.  In developing a model of sanction busting the regional 
context of the target is important for both the target and sender in gaining potential allies either 
for or against the sanction regime.    
 Next, this study also focused primarily on a state-based analysis for US sanctions and the 
formal response to that policy in sanction busting.  In constructing a full analysis of sanction 
busting informal methods must be factored into the model.  This presents several difficulties.  By 
its very nature informal methods are hidden from the normal conduct of established international 
trade.  Thus, measuring and modeling the means, size and scope of a sanction busting policy 
using informal methods would be difficult to establish in methods similar to analyzing formal 
methods.  In order to accomplish this several interdisciplinary resources will be required to draw 
upon.  The economic literature that has studies illicit economies would be necessary to establish 
the incentive structures of smuggling physical goods and various financial based crimes, i.e. 
money laundering and offshore tax havens (Gup 2007; Costigan and Gold 2007).  Sociological 
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studies involving the structure of such groups and the likelihood of gaining participants would 
help identify the potential for a target in gaining support for informal sanction busting missions.  
 In completing the picture of the target in facing a sanction regime the primary focus of 
the literature has ignored the basic strategic circumstances of the counter-strategy of sanction 
busting.  Often studies simply assume that most target will seek alternate markets for sanctioned 
goods and third party states will reap the benefits of having a dominant negotiating position.  
What is lacking is a formal understanding of the possible responses of the target and the 
conditions that determine the context facing the target.  While the impressive body of scholarship 
in addressing economic sanctions has yielded significant advances in the construction of policy 
the lack of a formal understanding for the target‟s context does reflect that the investigation into 
economic sanctions is not over. 
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